

Transcription of a two-day conference organised by the AFMJF

(Association Française des Magistrats de la Jeunesse et de la Famille)

5-6 June 2015

THE PLACE OF SECULARISM (*LAÏCITÉ*) AND RELIGION IN THE WAY ADOLESCENTS CONSTRUCT THEIR IDENTITY

Friday 5 June: Islamist radicalism and the young

Saturday 6 June: Justice and civil society

Introduction by Marie-Pierre HOURCADE, President of the AFMJF

Good morning everybody,

I am delighted to welcome you all here in this beautiful room which has been put at our disposal by Madame Arens, President of the Paris Court of Appeal, and would like to extend our grateful thanks to her.

We are very pleased to bring together, as we do every year with the support of the ENM (Training School for Judges), a number of colleagues from different sectors: juvenile court judges and members of the juvenile prosecution service; lawyers working with juveniles; assessors; social workers from the public sector and non-profit organisations; staff from the ASE (child welfare service) and also other associations working on issues of prevention, and the integration and protection of young people. We have the great honour of welcoming M. Robert Badinter, who will be with us this morning, and M. Pierre Joxe, who has manifested his support over the last few years, since exchanging his ministerial attire for that of a lawyer working with minors.

Last year we focused on justice in the 21st century, in particular the role of the judges, paying special attention to juvenile court judges in a rapidly changing society.

Little were we to know at the time that the month of January 2015 would see our country in the throes of a series of terrorist attacks. This led us to decide this year to examine the radicalisation of certain young people and, more broadly, to consider the place of religion in the way adolescents construct their identity.

This is an ambitious choice, not only because it covers so many disciplines but also because the subject itself is a highly sensitive one.

The impact of religion can be positive and, in theory, religion offers individuals a spiritual element which is inherent to human nature. Furthermore, depending on each person's convictions, religion is a cultural if not political fact which constructs or deconstructs.

In their everyday practice, judges are consciously or unconsciously aware of this reality, when they are asked

to examine applications for youth protection orders, when they have to arbitrate between positions with different or even incompatible cultural references, when they have to try to reconcile or persuade the parties, or sometimes to choose between respect of beliefs and convictions, religious or otherwise, on the one hand, and the freedom of the child or the adolescent, on the other. Or when they have to choose between the position of the parents, which may be too rigid, and the best interest of the child, which is to grow and develop in such a way as to be able to become a fully autonomous human being who has chosen what they want to be as an adult.

These cultural issues, whatever the religion, have an increasing impact on the work of juvenile court judges even if they are not necessarily made explicit, as is often the case when a child is referred to the authorities.

However, the judge is rapidly informed of the difficulties which arise when the beliefs and religious practices of the foster family do not correspond to those of the family of the child who has been taken into care. Similarly, should the care hostels adapt their calendar, their schedule and their rules to delinquent minors in the name of respect for religious convictions? Should Muslim social workers be allowed to pray with the Muslim minors in their care, for example? Religion is moving more and more out of the private sphere and more and more into a clearly expressed demand on the part of these adolescents that their religious identity be recognised.

We are not the only ones to be asking these questions, and a study led jointly by the IGA (Inspectorate-General of Home Affairs), the IGAS (Inspectorate-General of Social Affairs) and the ISJ (Inspectorate-General of the Judicial Services) to examine the respect of the principles of *laïcité* (secularism) within the establishments and services of the PJJ (Judicial Protection Service) is currently under way.

Catherine Sultan, director of the PJJ, will be telling us what the PJJ has decided in this matter.

A judge may be asked to examine cases of possible indoctrination or influence and will have to try to decide whether the child or the adolescent is in the hold of a person or a group of persons who, under the cover of religion and good intentions, may in fact have other intentions which have nothing to do with religion or spirituality.

It is a sensitive matter and open to interpretation. We rarely face it head on, although we know full well that adolescents search for absolute values and ideals, and that different kinds of utopia rarely have a place in our individualistic societies where individual success is considered the be all and end all, despite the fact that many of the young people we deal with have no hope. What can they hope for if they have already been defined as failures of the school system by the time they reach the end of their primary education? Or at least that is what they think. For some, their only prospects are crime and trafficking, for others it is exclusion and boredom, and it is no doubt in such a desperate and hopeless context that the most illusionary and extreme types of propaganda have an impact.

For months now we have been living in a state of fear of terrorism and of the radicalisation of young people. The government has started to take action to fight terrorism and has set up a “Deradicalisation Centre” run by Dounia Bouzar.

But what do we see when we look at the legal system and the courts for juvenile offenders or young people in difficulty?

Requests for juvenile court judges to hear applications are beginning to appear, and the juvenile prosecution service has reported around twenty incidences of radicalisation, some of them extremely worrying. The Paris juvenile court has set up a working group to examine the issue; the PJJ has recruited liaison officers for *laïcité*; the ENM (Training School for judges) has introduced special training sessions; the IHEJ (Institute for Advanced Studies in Justice) is working on the matter.

Various initiatives are being taken in the courts but it is clear that we don't know enough about the realities of this radicalisation. What is it, exactly? How can and do these messages have an impact? In what context? Which young people are involved and how can we respond, vis-à-vis the young people themselves and also their families? How can we stop people leaving for jihad and what should we do with and for those who return? Should we have the same approach towards young girls and young boys?

Many questions, many hypotheses and, above all, the risk of making dangerous generalisations and losing our points of reference when we take emergency actions and/or bow to the pressure of the media. Not forgetting the risk of acting ineffectively and being incapable of finding the right words to help a young person change direction.

For this is what lies at the heart of our work, to find a way to get a young person to change their attitude, to change their behaviour; in this area we find that children or adolescents who have been indoctrinated or are in permanent conflict or opposition refuse to listen to arguments based on reason.

The interest of our conference is to understand the phenomenon and to find out what can stop it. We need to challenge our ideas and assumptions, allow ourselves to return to earlier positions, we need to avoid the breakdown of family and other relationships, rebuild links and ties between people.

We asked the Institut d'Études de l'Islam et des Sociétés du Monde Musulman (Institute for the Study of Islam and Muslim Societies) to help us prepare the programme for this morning's session and also called upon other specialists, a sociologist and a psychoanalyst, to help provide answers to our questions. The round tables will be the occasion for an exchange between theory, concrete experience and your interrogations.

On Saturday we will pursue our work and extend it to a much needed collaboration between juvenile justice and civil society. The judges are overworked and don't have enough time to elaborate strategies with those who work on the ground and whose analysis of the realities of the situation is far superior but whose knowledge of the system of justice is often lacking. The AFMJF has signed a convention with the *Forum français pour la sécurité urbaine* (French Forum for Urban Security) to set up joint programmes. Bordeaux will probably be the first test site.

We have also used this meeting to state our position and say what we hope for from the reform of the *Ordonnance de 1945* (1945 Order). The AFMJF has drafted a motion which has been signed by a number of associations and public figures, and a debate has been scheduled for 11 o'clock Saturday, during which different professionals will be able to say what they hope for and expect from the reform. Madame Taubira, Minister of Justice, will honour us with her presence. Journalists have been informed of the debate and we hope they will come and cover the event. But how many will attend on a Saturday morning?

I think I have told you everything about the programme over the next two days. Those judges who are here as part of their ongoing education must sign in every morning and every afternoon on lists which have been prepared specially. We have called on several students to help with practical and logistical matters. Cécile, who is preparing a Master's degree, is in charge of transcribing our presentations and exchanges. Please make sure you give your name and speak into the mike. Two students who have qualified in cinema studies will be making a film; they may film you or ask you for an interview. The film will be available on our website but if you have any objections to being filmed or interviewed, just say so, it is not a problem.

So, with no further ado, may I ask our first speaker, Samir Amghar, to come and join me.

Radicalisation: a phenomenon specific to young people?

M. Samir AMGHAR

Presentation by Mme Hourcade

The research leading to your doctorate in sociology at the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris focused on the dynamics of re-Islamisation and the transformations of Islamism in Europe. You are a member of the Institut d'Études de l'Islam des Sociétés du Monde Musulman and a consultant for the Swiss Ministry of Defence. Among other publications you have edited a collection of articles entitled *Islamiste d'occident et état des lieux des perspectives*. You are currently a researcher at the Free University in

Brussels.

Samir AMGHAR

Good morning ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to begin by thanking your association for the interest you have shown in my research. My aim this morning is to identify what I consider to be the central issue today and to try to understand, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the dynamics of re-Islamisation not just in France but also throughout the rest of Europe.

To do so, we need to begin by a quantitative presentation of what is at stake.

In France there are between 2.5 and 6 million Muslims, although certain experts and also religious leaders may disagree with these figures. France is the country in Western Europe with the largest Muslim community, while the Muslim population in Great Britain or Germany is around 2 million. In addition, the Muslim population in France is considerably bigger than that in certain “Muslim” countries such as Bahrain, Qatar or Lebanon. This point is very important.

The other important point is that, in the last 20 years or so, there has been a dynamic of re-Islamisation, i.e. a return to Islam which affects mainly 2nd or 3rd generation Muslims. This is a relatively new phenomenon which raises a large number of questions, and most sociologists and political scientists disagree as to how to interpret it. Some think that it is mainly the result of the quest for an identity for those who wish to find a meaning to life in a society which they find alienating. For others, this dynamic of re-Islamisation, this return to Islam is mainly the result of a very specific form of the religion.

In other words, the re-Islamisation movement we see today, the Islamisation of a certain number of social practices, a greater expression of Islam in public spaces, all of this is due to re-Islamisation movements that we could define as forms of Islamic militancy.

I will break my presentation down into two parts:

To begin with, I will brush a broad portrait of Islam in France, with particular emphasis on what are called re-Islamisation movements. I will try to identify the main movements concerned. What they have in common is a very specific view of Islam which is not necessarily radical but which considers that Islam should not only concern the individual on a religious and spiritual level but should also, to a certain extent, occupy the public space in France.

I will go on to identify and define what Islamic radicalisation is, based on the research I have been doing for a number of years, and to identify those factors which push young people into becoming radical Muslims. It should be noted that the term radicalisation has at least two meanings: what one could call sectarian radicalisation, in the sense used by sociologists, and what one could call politico-religious radicalisation.

Description of Islam in France

Three major trends can be identified in what can be called militant Islam and which is part of the dynamic of re-Islamisation.

First, we have individuals who claim a political interpretation of Islam and follow the doctrinal line of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Secondly, we have movements where one’s actions or main activities should take the form of religious preaching. These movements could be described as missionary movements.

Lastly, there are movements whose reading of Islam is far more radical and which insist on the need to defend Islamic identity when it is challenged or threatened, through the use of violence.

Political Islam following the line of the Muslim Brotherhood

A large number of associations, structures and public figures claim a greater or lesser affiliation to the position of the Muslim Brotherhood. What is characteristic of these individuals is that at some point in the past they have lived either in the Maghreb or in the Mashriq and they have decided to come and settle in France or elsewhere in Europe for political reasons.

In other words, they are individuals with Islamic sympathies they had in their countries of origin in the 60s, 70s and 80s and who decided to settle in France in order to avoid or escape the repression of their countries which, at the time, were considered to be authoritarian regimes. And they used France as a political platform. In their eyes, France is a country which allows them to continue to be politically active in the name of Islam, not in order to Islamise or direct the Muslim populations living in France with a political aim in mind, but to use France as an echo chamber so as to address the authoritarian regimes in their own countries in the eventuality that they would return, once the country had become democratic and politically open. It is essential to bear this aspect in mind.

One of the major organisations following this logic is the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organisations in France), which was founded in 1983 by Tunisians who were members of the Islamic movement of the time, the *Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique* (Movement of the Islamic Tendency). This movement was fairly active in the 70s and 80s and still is today, in different forms, in that it was part of the Tunisian government until very recently. At the beginning, the aim of the organisation was to provide a place for isolated Islamists. They included refugees who had settled in France and also individuals who had come to France to study and who had acquired Islamist sympathies at university in their home countries.

Up to the beginning of the 90s, their speeches were highly politicised, not with the Muslim populations living in France in mind, but their countries of origin. From 1989 onwards there was a shift in emphasis, in particular on the part of the UOIF. The idea was no longer to serve Islam as a political tool aimed at the Arab regimes but to try to take root in the political, cultural and social life of France. For them, it became important to try and put in place a form of Islam “of” France, as opposed to an Islam “in” France. Remember that UOIF meant the Union of Islamic Organisations in France and in 1989 this was changed to “of France”, thus reflecting the desire to ground the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood in a French reality. For the officials of the Muslim Brotherhood who belonged to the UOIF, the idea was to adapt the text to the context, and this was repeated regularly in their speeches. What needed to be done was to define a Muslim religious practice while taking the French context into account. Their starting point was that Islam must necessarily adapt to a country when in the minority in that country. One of the theoreticians of this contextualisation of Islam in France was Tareq Oubrou, a Moroccan imam from Bordeaux, who in the 2000s wrote an article which has served as a conceptual matrix for the “Sharia of the minority”.

The specificity of this religious approach is that it also entails the creation of an Islamic citizenship, i.e. the possibility that Muslim religious practice can adapt perfectly to the exercise of one’s citizenship. The idea was put forward that there is a close correlation between citizenship and Islam: because one is a good Muslim, one is necessarily a good citizen.

In the 1990s a new rhetoric based on an Islamic citizenship was developed, the theoretical foundation of which was put forward by Tariq Ramadan in a number of speeches and publications where he underlined the need for such an approach. In its presentations, conferences and publications, the UOIF systematically put forward the idea that the values of the Republic and of Islam were compatible. Surprising though this may seem, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose interpretation of Islam could be said to be both orthodox and orthopractic, consider that this is indeed compatible with the values of the Republic. In other words, a Muslim is a Muslim who has a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Islam isn’t merely a relationship with the divine, but also a relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Consequently, in the name of republican values as claimed by the Muslim Brotherhood, these Muslim leaders give themselves the right to defend Muslim reality when they feel it is being challenged. In 1989, for example, they defended young schoolgirls who had been expelled from school for wearing Islamic headscarves. Their arguments weren’t based on religious values but essentially on the values of the Republic, since they asserted that by expelling these schoolgirls the fundamental right to freedom of conscience had been violated.

A number of different structures and organisations were set up as part of this dynamic, including the

Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France (CCIF, Collective against Islamophobia in France). The aim of this association, which has a distant connection with the heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood, is to defend Muslims in the courts or to sue in their name every time they are attacked because of their Muslim identity. Although the majority of the CCIF's members are orthodox Muslims, the arguments they put forward are not based on religion, even if the underlying reason for their action is religious or as a result of Islamic solidarity, but are strictly legal in nature. To help them prepare their cases, the association called on a large number of lawyers specialised in French law, and not on imams.

What is important here is that this interpretation of Islam was both orthodox and orthopractic while at the same time enabling Muslims to be fully integrated in French society. It mainly addressed individuals from the middle and upper middle classes, for the following reasons. Firstly, the style of language used by these organisations, which follow the line of the Muslim Brotherhood, includes a number of relatively abstract concepts such as the "values of the Republic" or "citizenship", which are easier to understand if one is educated and has possibly gone to university. Secondly, those people who espouse this form of Islam are searching for arguments which justify their upward social mobility and social status. If you are a Muslim, it is in your interest to pursue your spiritual quest in a form of Islam which enables you to justify your integration in society from a religious standpoint rather than from a position which justifies your exclusion from society and thus disqualifies this integration.

This form of Islam develops around individuals who are infused with a kind of religious authority, coupled with a certain charisma, and Tariq Ramadan is a prime example of such a person.

Allow me to digress a little in order to illustrate the importance of a charismatic figure of authority in the process of re-Islamisation, through something that happened when I was a student. A friend of mine very much appreciated Tariq Ramadan, but I didn't share his enthusiasm. In the eyes of my friend, Tariq Ramadan worked for the good of the community, while I tried to deconstruct his discourse. My friend told me that one day his sister was checking Tariq Ramadan's luggage in at the airport and, having recognised him, gave him her brother's phone number. A few days later Tariq Ramadan called my friend and they discussed things for about ten minutes. A year later the neighbourhood association where my friend lived invited Tariq Ramadan to give a talk. At the end, my friend went over to Tariq Ramadan, who recognised him, and they kissed. My friend told me that as he took Tariq Ramadan in his arms he had a sensation of infinity. The point of this story is to give depth to this dynamic type of re-Islamisation.

The Muslim Brotherhood have played an extremely important role in this dynamic of re-Islamisation, thanks to their ability to mobilise young people. Through their various activities they have introduced Islam to a number of young people, with the result that many middle class adolescents have had more or less close contact with the Muslim Brotherhood

The second trend to play an essential role in the dynamic of re-Islamisation is the Tabligh movement.

The Tabligh movement

This movement is considered to be the most important Islamic movement in the world. It originated in India/Pakistan and, thanks to its enormous ability to mobilise people, organises every year a huge gathering of followers, second only to the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Between 1 and 2 million people meet at the International Tabligh Centre in India and Pakistan.

The Tabligh movement has two important principles. It considers that the aim of all organisations should be a proselytising one. It is therefore a missionary-style movement, which is why a number of specialists have described it as the Jehovah Witnesses of Islam. It is made up of organisations which are set up around 4 or 5 individuals who travel from city to city, from mosque to mosque, from country to country, in order to bring nominal Muslims back to Islam. It is a movement which has helped structure the dynamic of re-Islamisation in that the majority of people who were converted to Islam or reaffirmed their Islamic identity in the period 1990-2000 did so as the result of contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood or the Tabligh movement.

Other organisations also played a relatively important role but I won't go into detail here, given that my time is limited. But let us nevertheless briefly consider the third trend which regularly hits the headlines: the Salafist movement.

The Salafist movement

One thing which is extremely important is that Salafism is multi-faceted, with three main strands and a very specific understanding of Islam. What is common to all three strands is that they all have a literal interpretation of Islam, both in terms of how to interpret the Qur'anic verses and how to interpret the traditions of the Prophet. A good Muslim is a Muslim who has an orthodox understanding of Islam and who tries to imitate the gestures of the prophet. If the prophet sleeps on his right side, then this is how one should sleep.

Salafism is divided into three major strands:

The first one, which we could call quietist, has developed a literalist approach to Islam and gives priority to Islamic education. This means teaching Muslims what true Islam is. The specific feature of this strand is that it is apolitical and non violent. Apolitical, as it considers that excessive politicisation is harmful and that it is urgent to bring Muslim populations back to Islam. It is fundamentally opposed to the political strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular in the person of Tariq Ramadan. Equally interesting, this strand of Salafism preaches non violence; orthopractic and ultra orthodox but non violent. It is for this reason that the Salafist leaders, most of who come from the Arabian Peninsula, unanimously and unambiguously condemn the different terrorist attacks carried out by Daech (ISIS, Islamic State) or Al Qaida. They condemned the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (September 11, 2001), the attacks in London and Madrid in 2004 and 2005, etc. Salafism is thus a form of Islam which is radically opposed to jihadism.

The second one, which we could call political, considers that it is important to develop a literalist approach to Islam, coupled with a commitment to French society. This strand is very much in the minority.

And then there is the third and last strand, which emphasises violence. I will focus on this strand in the second part of my presentation.

We should bear in mind the fact that the vast majority of individuals who claim to be Salafists in France belong to the first category. This third strand is thus most upsetting for apolitical and non-violent Salafists, who are lumped together with the violent group and find themselves being labelled as jihadist Salafists.

What they are interested in is the practice of Islam and they are not interested in what is going on in France and they don't want to mix with the rest of French society. They don't recognise the dominant values of French society: *laïcité*, social diversity, democracy, etc. Ultimately, they feel they will have to leave France for a Muslim country. Having said this, even if this form of Islam can be considered to be fundamentalist, an ultra orthodox form of Islam since they do not recognise the dominant values of the society in which they live, they nevertheless try to respect the laws of the Republic and not challenge them.

Definition of Islamic radicalisation and identification of the factors leading to the radicalisation of young people

In my second part I will try to identify the dynamic of re-Islamisation on the basis of revolutionary Salafism.

Revolutionary Salafism is a form of Salafism which has developed a literalist approach to Islam and which elevates to the level of a religious obligation the need to defend Muslims through the use of direct action, violence, physical pressure, etc.

For these jihadists, religious proselytism is useful but is not a priority at the moment. They also consider that although the political strategy of a Muslim or of political Salafists may be useful, given the balance of power today it doesn't get them anywhere, or rather to the opposite of what they would like to achieve. For example, jihadists will say systematically that anti-Muslim laws have been passed, such as those proscribing the wearing of ostentatious signs of religion or full-face veils. It follows on therefore that the next step is to use violence, as political strategy doesn't work.

What we need to do is to distinguish between the different forms of jihadism. There is what we can call international jihadism, where an individual decides to leave France and go to conflict zones where Muslim identity is under threat. Then there is what we can call home grown terrorists, who commit terrorist acts on French soil.

These two forms of jihadism are based on different logics, even if the intellectual ideological matrix is identical.

International jihadism

In this category we find individuals who decide to leave for conflict zones. This is not new and in the 1990s, for example, individuals left for Bosnia Herzegovina, for Chechnya, in the period 2000-2005 for Iraq and, more recently, Syria, which seems to be a “popular” destination.

The logic behind these decisions is rather specific. Jihadists who function within international jihadism do so for different reasons. Firstly, they act out of Islamic solidarity with those they consider to be their brothers as such. Secondly, they consider that this community which lives in conflict zones is under threat by enemies, or those they consider to be enemies, of Islam.

During the Iraqi conflict, the enemy was made up of non-Muslim, western armies, and in particular the US army. In their speeches they were very anti-imperialist, anti-American and anti-Western. With the conflict in Syria the target changed and became less anti-American and anti-imperialist and more anti-Shiite. Individuals who leave for Syria go there less for anti-Western reasons than to fight those they consider to be internal enemies of Islam, i.e. Shiites, given that the ultimate aim is to fight the regime of Bashar El Assad and all his allies, including Iran.

This point has been confirmed by different studies on the ground. Last year I analysed anti-Semitic speech in mosques and on the part of Muslims and what became clear was that it wasn't anti-Semitism which was important in the dynamic of radicalisation but an anti-Shiite discourse.

So we have those individuals who decide to leave for many different reasons, including those we have just seen, and also those individuals who prefer not to go to conflict zones in Arab countries but to commit terrorist acts on French soil. Although they share a common logic their aims are totally different.

Home grown terrorists

Here the aim isn't to defend an imaginary Muslim identity the other side of the border or within the Muslim world, but to defend this identity which is threatened and discriminated against by Westerners, and in particular the French.

If we look at the short interview given by the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly on BFM TV, we see that at no time did Coulibaly mention either the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or what is happening in Iraq or American imperialism. He explained that the reason why he had decided to commit this type of act was to avenge persons of the Muslim faith living in France who he felt were treated unfairly.

Now that the distinction between these two types of jihadism has been made clear, we need to return to what could be called the process of radicalisation and the object of radicalisation. We need to try to understand why certain individuals decide to turn to Islamic violence.

There are several major explanations:

The first is sociological and is based on the principle that these individuals are excluded from society and wish to express their disagreement with this exclusion through violence. These people are disadvantaged, underprivileged, unemployed, lower working class and do not feel that they have a place in the French economic system.

This sociological explanation is fine as far as it goes but becomes problematic as soon as we look more closely at the sociological profiles of those who either commit terrorist attacks in France or decide to join the ranks of Islamic State or go to Syria. What we find is a fairly high proportion of people from a lower or upper middle class background. There are two main reasons for this phenomenon, which can be found in most revolutionary organisations, be they left-wing or right-wing.

The first is that there is a close correlation between the level of education and the level of political awareness. The greater the level of higher education, the greater the level of political awareness and the

desire to commit oneself. The second is that jihadist organisations are selective. It is much more in their interest to recruit someone with a good university education than someone who has very little education. It is much more in their interest to recruit someone with computer skills or a qualified chemist than a plumber or a locksmith.

The second factor or lever for radicalisation is that these jihadists have a very specific interpretation of Islam. Islam would in fact be in part the result of these processes of radicalisation. Remember the reaction of the Muslim religious authorities following the attacks on Charlie Hebdo. They all explained that what had happened at Charlie Hebdo had nothing to do with Islam. What is interesting is that all of these religious authorities denied any responsibility for the events. Yet it is clear that the forms of Islam proposed by a certain number of preachers or Muslim associations sow the seeds of a possible radicalisation. One interpretation of Islam authorises this recourse to violence.

The third factor which helps explain this radicalisation is the idea that these processes of radicalisation feed on political frustration. Since these individuals cannot express themselves legally, they turn to violence.

To take a simplistic view, let us look at what happened in 2012, when a film on the life of the Prophet created a great scandal. Two hundred Muslims demonstrated against the film in Paris. However, the demonstration had not been authorised by the police, and this led to the riot police being called in; they arrested the majority of demonstrators, even though it was a pacific demonstration, with people praying in the streets. Some of those arrested were held in custody, others were charged with various offences. As a result, a number of people said that given the fact that if they demonstrate their views on Islamic identity peacefully they are immediately arrested, then why not turn to violence since they have nothing to lose as they will be arrested anyway.

Radicalisation is very often the consequence of a kind of political frustration and a number of Arab regimes have understood this perfectly. The political system is blocked and it would be necessary to open it up a bit in order to short-circuit this type of demand.

In 2003, a terrorist attack in Casablanca caused the deaths of about 50 people. The reaction of the Moroccan authorities was to outlaw the Moroccan Islamist Party. A number of top politicians in Morocco considered that this was not the right solution. By banning the freedom of expression of those who follow a political Islam it would merely push individuals who up until then had enjoyed a legitimate form of political expression into clandestinity and secrecy. It was the second version which won the day, with the idea of short-circuiting a possible radicalisation by allowing members of the PJD (who were responsible for the attacks) to express the grievances of those who are not necessarily represented by the traditional Moroccan political system. Provided they abide by the rules of the political game, the most radical Islamic forces can play the role of spokespersons in order to prevent a minority from turning to violence because they are not recognised by the political system or traditional parties.

The fourth element which I feel is important is that these processes of radicalisation feed off excessive recourse to the law in the face of radicalism. Until recently, the political system or strategies adopted in the fight against jihadism in France were essentially based on repression, with a threefold approach: identify, dismantle and arrest. Thanks to this system a certain number of terrorist cells were dismantled, a certain number of leaders were incarcerated and a certain number of terrorist attacks on French soil were prevented. The underlying idea is that prison can both deter and rehabilitate and can make the individual think about the immorality of the act. This technique can and does work, but not for all.

If we take the case of Farid Benitou, who had been sent to prison for 6 or 7 years, having been found guilty of belonging to an Iraqi network, prison turned out to be effective as, on release, he decided to return to society and trained as a nurse. But if we take the case of one of the Kouachi brothers who had also served a prison sentence, this was neither a deterrent nor a source of rehabilitation. The question thus arises as to the efficacy of the repressive strategy adopted in France. In my opinion, this excessive recourse to the system of criminal justice when dealing with radicalisation pushes individuals to radicalise even more and to shift to the margins of society.

As a result, in a number of ministries of justice in Western Europe and the Middle East, discussions are under way concerning the need to introduce deradicalisation programmes. In other words, repression works but is

not a perfect solution. In Saudi Arabia a deradicalisation programme has been put in place for the first time and you have seen that a similar type of programme has recently been introduced in Denmark.

The Danish deradicalisation programme is interesting. Its aim is to look after those who return from Syria, but on a voluntary basis, the idea being to avoid criminalising them and to refrain from making value judgments on their activities. The Danish authorities do not consider these people as terrorists but as rebels. This is in no way based on a humanistic approach but is purely pragmatic and is seen as the best way to prevent these young people from turning to violence. It is important to underline the fact that these deradicalisation programmes reflect the idea that one must show a certain flexibility towards people who may have committed terrorist attacks, a position which can be found elsewhere in Europe and also in the Arab world.

If we take the case of Morocco, I have already spoken about the 2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca. One of those responsible for the attack was Mohamed Fizazi, who declared that he was a jihadist Salafist and who was found guilty and sentenced to prison for having been the intellectual and spiritual inspiration of this kind of attack. He was released after serving 7 years, having received a royal pardon. This pardon was motivated by a form of pragmatism, as it was felt that Mohamed Fizazi could be used as a tool to fight the development of terrorism in the country. And so it was his authority and religious legitimacy that they hoped to harness through efficient counter speeches, as he was still a role model for a number of Moroccan jihadists. This individual who had openly criticised the monarchy in 2003 has become one of its most fervent supporters and considers that the king is a factor of unity and cohesion.

Various countries in the Arab world are going to try to use individuals who could be described as *pentito*, i.e. who have repented, in order to fight terrorism through the development of counter speeches, in the hope that this could be quite efficient.

QUESTIONS

M-P Hourcade: *Thank you for this presentation. It is interesting to hear about these different religious movements which challenge republican values to a greater or lesser degree. How many people are followers of the revolutionary Salafist movement?*

S. Amghar: I don't have any statistics or even a range of figures.

M-P Hourcade: *The young people we deal with may also be attracted by these revolutionary Salafist movements, more so than by the first movement you spoke about. Young people also follow the religion of their parents and follow this far less orthodox form of Islam. When you tell us about the experimental approaches adopted in Denmark or in Saudi Arabia, which are more about prevention, unlike what we do in France, it is fair to say that we are a long way away from this type of reasoning. We are very much into repression, which is efficient in the short term, but given the concentration of these populations in the prisons we have problems finding solutions vis-à-vis these terrorists. Could you tell us how it works in Denmark, what kind of programme is put in place? What happens to the rebels, what do the Danish authorities do with them?*

S. Amghar: This programme is based on a number of elements, the aim being to provide a form of Islam which deconstructs the jihadist ideal. The second aspect is to provide psychological support. The third aspect is to help the person to go back to university and/or to find work.

As for the polemic following the terrorist attacks in 2015, our politicians immediately shifted the debate away from the political dimension of the events but ultimately to the lack of *laïcité* in our institutions. If the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly decided to become radicalised it was that basically they were not secular. In my opinion that is maybe what should be considered. But it may also be a faulty analysis which has led to the underestimation of the political variable as an explanation of the process of radicalisation. It may be the result of political frustration, of a particularly strong feeling of political resentment which it is impossible to channel other than through the use of violence. And so it is as absurd as saying that if the members of *Action*

Directe (a French terrorist group) committed terrorist acts or carried out political assassinations in the 70s and 80s, it is because when they were young they didn't have any civics classes in school. It is this type of reasoning which is a real error in analysis or a misunderstanding of the situation and the processes of radicalisation.

Hervé Hamon, former President of the Paris juvenile court: *About adolescence and the different movements. How do you see the two fit together? Taking Coulibaly, for example, how come a repeat petty offender turns to radical Islam? Do you have an explanation which would take on board the particularities of adolescence?*

S. Amghar: I think it is important not to reduce these processes of Islamisation or of re-Islamisation to a simple question of identity. This aspect exists and is fundamental, it is the desire to define one's own identity but at the same time to find a group of peers one can recognise oneself in. But there are other important elements. One element which is often underestimated is that this dynamic of re-Islamisation and the process of radicalisation are often a response to what could be called a logic of social distinction. That is to say that if I become a Muslim, if I grow a beard, it is a way not only to show society that I disagree with it but also to show my superiority vis-à-vis other Muslims who could be considered to be "wishy-washy", "easy-going", "soft". There is this desire to stand out, socially speaking, it is a question of respectability. The fact of wearing a face-veil is a way for the individual to exist.

Let me illustrate what I mean with a brief anecdote. When I was preparing my doctorate on Salafism, I met an Algerian with whom I had a long discussion. He suggested that it would be instructive to go for a walk in the neighbourhood of the town he lived in, once our interview was over. He had a long beard, wore a djellaba and as we walked along he greeted everybody. He explained that having a beard and wearing a djellaba represented his soul. I wanted to repeat the experiment. I did so in a poor area in Seine Saint-Denis with a fairly large Muslim population and observed that although I walked past people who I didn't know, they looked at me and some of them greeted me. I existed, whereas previously, without this attire, I was totally invisible. I said to myself that it would be interesting to repeat the experiment in another district, and I chose the Place Vendôme (a wealthy part of Paris). The reaction was somewhat different, but even though people looked at me suspiciously, I existed.

And this feeling of existing helps explain these processes of re-Islamisation or radicalisation. And from these processes of existence another process is born which is the aestheticisation of Islam, i.e. that religious behaviours or a return to Islam or to violence should not systematically be measured against the yardstick of the ideological variable. In other words, if an individual becomes radicalised it is because preachers have incited him to do so, but it is necessary to add another variable which is that, basically, when I am an individual who wishes to become Islamised I am trying to use a cost/benefit analysis. Which religious practice will be the easiest to implement and will take up the least time? Which religious practice will enable me to be the most visible among Muslims and will require little investment? It is from this perspective that you can understand the different visible forms of Muslim practice. If we do a quick survey of Muslim practices, we will see that it is those of the 2nd and 3rd generations who respect the five prayers a day rule relatively flexibly, between roughly 15 and 20% of people obey the rule assiduously, but the vast majority will respect the dietary rule and only eat halal meat. First, because it is easier to eat halal meat and second, because it is a practice which is far more visible than praying.

Daniel Pical, honorary judge: *I was extremely interested in the different categories you have just described for us and have a number of questions. You have explained the arrival of different waves of more or less radicalised Muslims in the 80s or earlier and have observed that especially in the more recent waves of arrivals, intellectuals or better educated people were preferred, in order to develop more sophisticated concepts. But if we examine what happened in January with the terrorist attacks and even if we go back to the case of Mohamed Merah, we see that they weren't intellectuals, they weren't highly educated people capable of working with sophisticated concepts. In the cases of the Kouachi brothers and Coulybaly, for instance, we have individuals whose education is limited and who are involved in ordinary petty crime, in a life of delinquency. Above all, they are 2nd, 3rd or 4th generation youngsters born in France of parents who are already more or less French and they went to French schools, etc. So how can we explain that these young people are actively involved in terrorism, even though they don't fit this profile?*

In addition, concerning those who have grown a beard and wear a djellaba, although it is clear that this is a

way for them to assert their identity, are they really the most dangerous individuals and the most likely to turn to violence? We have also observed, both in prisons and outside, that the most dangerous individuals are maybe those who don't have a beard and who are dressed like everyone else, and that they are the most dangerous as they want to go unnoticed and to melt into the background.

S.Amghar: As far as the question of the recruitment or background of people who turn to violence is concerned, I didn't say that they only came from a lower or upper middle class background but that many of these recruits were indeed from these social categories. Alongside these people we find working class individuals who don't necessarily have a good grasp of religious matters or really understand the jihadist ideology. We are in a period which could be described as the end of ideologies. Unlike during the 60s and 70s, it is no longer necessary to be trained in a particular ideology. Among those present here today some of you may be UMP or PS party activists or party officials. But does being an activist mean that we have read all of Jean Jaurès' speeches or de Gaulle's memoirs? No. You don't need to understand the ins and outs of the ideology of such or such organisation in order to feel an empathy with their position.

The second fundamental element which helps understand these processes of radicalisation and the presence of what we could call underprivileged or marginalised individuals is the concept of family altruism, which has been proposed by a group of Belgian researchers. Family altruism helps understand how and why individuals from a working class background or who are marginalised turn to violence. Let me give you an example. In the 50s or 60s, during the awarding of the Nobel prize for literature Albert Camus was asked "what is your position on the war for national liberation?" His answer: "I love justice but if I have to choose between justice and my mother, I will always choose my mother." In other words, choose France, even if France defends a position which could be considered unjust.

Using this concept of family altruism we can understand how some of those who are marginalised or who have little money or who go through long periods of precarity turn to violence. According to this concept, a person is more likely to become radicalised if this radicalisation has no financial impact on the family. If I, as an individual, decide to leave home, I am going to think of the possible consequences of this choice on the family's finances. If I am out of work and if I have a family who depend on me financially, and if I get low state benefits, I am more likely to turn to violence than if these benefits are sufficient to keep the family going, financially speaking.

The question of the visibility of Islam is an interesting one. One of the strategies of the Ministry of the Interior was to try to identify the signs of radicalisation early enough to prevent the person from possibly turning to violence. But what exactly are the signs of radicalism? It is the fact of no longer listening to music, for example, or no longer watching television, or refusing to shake a man's or a woman's hand. However, what we see is that the processes of radicalisation are at times totally disconnected from the processes of Islamisation. If we take the case of Mohamed Merah, for example, he did not show any outward sign of being a jihadist, he didn't have a long beard, he didn't wear a djellaba, and when the police arrived he was on a Play Station. So in my opinion it is important to try and distinguish between the different signs of radicalisation which we could call religious signs of radicalisation and those which are truly problematic or political. There is a jihadist literature which invites militants, at least in the West, to try and espouse the customs of the host country. What is important is to be invisible, to go unnoticed.

Maxime Zennou, Director General, SOS jeunesse (SOS youth) which runs establishments for the protection of young people and the legal protection of young people: *Have you observed a change since Charlie Hebdo? Is there a before and an after? From a public policy point of view, in particular concerning the issues of minors and young people, which are of great importance to us, it is true that we were probably wrong to pay scant attention to and be relatively indifferent to questions of religious belief and practice, within organisations whose task is the protection of minors and young people. A relative indifference and possibly a form of denial in the face of a certain number of manifestations which were not reported to the higher echelons of the system. Today we have a deployment strategy which starts with greater police and judicial action and continues with those who are specialised in child protection asking themselves what should be done. How should we analyse the phenomenon, how can we understand it, what responses should we give, how can we prevent it?*

S.Amghar: Yes indeed, the authorities are now more aware of what is going on, that is to say that before the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, the French approach to security and their strategy to fight jihadism were

basically repressive. This type of attack has given the authorities the opportunity to reassess their strategy and to shift more and more towards prevention. An important point: the authorities are incapable of dealing with religious manifestations of Islam even when they are conflictual, in a way other than when dealing with the processes of violent radicalisation.

In a nutshell, they started from the principle that words preceded actions. In other words, if I say that I hate France then sooner or later I will inevitably express this hatred through violent action.

However, we know perfectly well that verbal violence, a declaration of violence, is a way of diverting a person away from actually committing a violent act. In addition, we had a linear view of the processes of radicalisation, i.e. that an individual always progresses from stage 1 to the next stage. Very often this radicalisation was preceded by a religious form of radicalisation such as growing one's beard, regular attendance at the mosque, etc. But today we observe that in reality this linear process is no longer the case, unlike in the 90s. Then people would become involved in an organisation like the Tabligh and a minority of individuals did indeed turn to violence.

Today things have completely changed, i.e. the fact of becoming a strictly observant orthodox Muslim is no longer an indication of systematic recourse to violence later on. If we take the example of apolitical Salafism, it has a cathartic effect on certain young people and prevents them from turning to violence since they develop a form of religious reasoning which is ultra orthodox, based on the idea that if you are a Muslim you must direct your energy to Islam and nothing else, and not become involved in violence or politics. A number of Arab countries, and even European ones, have understood this. So we can work with this type of person, even if we disagree completely with their interpretation of Islam, even if we think this type of Islam is backward, because it can be used to try to divert these young people away from actually committing violent acts. We have seen this in Algeria, in Egypt, etc. Jihadism was powerful and constituted a threat to the security of these two countries, which is why the authorities decided to let this quietist version of Salafism prosper.

Mélanie Hague, juvenile court judge: I would like to know if your analysis especially of the profiles which lead to radicalisation is valid for young people. And how extremist movements exploit this.

S.Amghar: It all depends on what you mean by young people. If it is minors we are talking about, then yes. But in my research I have never studied minors so I cannot suggest any explanations. What I have always been interested in are young adults of 18 and over.

M-P Hourcade: A study has been done in the USA which shows that these young Islamists who leave to join the Jihad are becoming younger and younger, that there are more and more of them, and that young women are also involved. Do we have any information on the increasing youth of these young adults?

S.Amghar: I don't want to disappoint you but I don't have any information on this precise point.

Geneviève Lefevre, juvenile court judge in Paris: I would like to know how revolutionary jihadism is structured, I mean are there small fairly autonomous groups which share the same ideology or is it more structured than that? I would also like to know if there are any links between those who leave for Syria and those who commit or try to commit terrorist acts in France, in other words is there an overall strategy.

S.Amghar: As far as the structuring of jihadism is concerned we mustn't forget that things have changed considerably. Jihadism is an ideology based on a rigid interpretation of a number of aspects of Islam. But at the same time it feeds on and is constructed by its environment. Changes have occurred both in terms of where recruits are found and the method used to convert them to jihadism. In the 90s most young people were recruited in the mosques. People came to preach there, not necessarily imams, but people who gave informal classes and took advantage of these classes to recruit individuals or encourage them to leave for Iraq or Bosnia, or to commit terrorist attacks on French soil. Since 9/11 (2001) the authorities have realised that mosques are the place where young people are radicalised, hence the importance of monitoring what goes on in these places of worship. As a result of this increased surveillance and intelligence in the mosques, the jihadists have changed their way of recruiting people and now function essentially on networks of interpersonal relationships. It is these relationships which underpin the jihadist cells.

Before, there used to be a hierarchical structure made up of a small number of individuals. Now we find an

individualised approach to jihadism. You no longer need to be part of a group to adopt a jihadist position. You do, however, need to be in contact with a charismatic leader or a group but you can rapidly separate from the group in order to commit these terrorist attacks. A certain number of jihadist theoreticians have realised that one of the weaknesses of modern jihadism, in particular as promoted by Al Qaida, was due to the “institutionalisation” of jihad. It made it very easy to identify individuals since it was easy to identify a group of persons with suspect activities. But, in order to be efficient, one has to be invisible, and so the jihadist has to organise himself around relatively autonomous individuals, while at the same time maintaining more or less close links with the group.

M-P Hourcade: Just before thanking you, M. Amghar, for the quality of your presentation and the thought-provoking remarks you have made, I have a final question. When you explained that the reaction of the Government, whether through repression, and the response based on the republican values which are the bedrock of our society, we could ask ourselves whether this can have an impact. We have the impression that the impact would be very limited as we are in a different political register and a different kind of commitment.

S.Amghar: It is quite clear that the aim of all these debates in parliament and all the questions politicians ask themselves about the issue of radicalisation is not so much to try to tackle and get to grips with the source of the problem as to try to respond to the fears of the population at large or to pacify public opinion.

The day after the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo I met the advisor to one of the ministers involved in these issues and we spoke at great length about the reasons why young people become radicalised and I told him about this famous poster which the Ministry of the Interior had put online and which tried to identify the signs of radicalism. And I told him that it was maybe somewhat problematic to generalise and to lump orthodox Muslims and violent radical individuals together in one category. And his reply was extremely interesting and a perfect reflection of the attitude of French politicians on this question.

I mean that this is the answer he gave: “Yes but, M. Amghar, by refusing to shake hands with a woman one is challenging the notion of social cohesion.” I replied that they were not challenging public order and public interest or national identity. We are talking on two different levels and even if there is an overlap, the responses are completely different. Radical practices which may threaten social cohesion, and there is no doubt that this exists, and radical practices which threaten national security are two different things and shouldn’t be confused one with the other.

Radical jihadist discourse and its vectors

Dominique THOMAS

Introduction by Mme Hourcade

We are delighted to welcome Dominique Thomas, a researcher who graduated from the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (National Institute for the Study of Oriental Languages and Civilisations) and the Political Science Institute in Paris. He is a specialist of Islamism and a consultant for the Department of Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence. In particular, he has worked on Islamist systems in Europe and in Great Britain and he is here today to tell us about the vectors of radicalisation and how young people, minors, are attracted by this radical speech.

Dominique THOMAS

Good morning ladies and gentlemen,

My focus this morning will be on an overview of Islamism today and why a large number of young and less young individuals are attracted to and become involved in this movement. Islamism is developing rapidly worldwide.

One should be aware that this radical discourse is propagated through a certain number of interconnected elements: we have those who develop and disseminate the ideas and the places where these ideas are received and where social connections are put in place. In order to construct a discourse a source is necessary and I would like to insist on this point. There would be no jihadist discourse if there were no sources and this is what is important as this is what the discourse feeds off. Jihadism is not the result of spontaneous combustion; it takes advantage of a favourable context.

Jihadism today is very much connected to a favourable context, but in the past, too, there was a very favourable context in the Middle-East for the liberation of radical groups, who expressed themselves through other forms of activism but not Islamic activism. We have seen violent and less violent forms of activism, radical but not necessarily accompanied by jihadist discourse. We have seen groups who declared themselves to be on the far left of the political spectrum who have also used violence as a system and who were present in the Arab world. Arab nationalism, too, has seen the development of insurrectional and violent movements which had recourse to arms and took advantage of a context which was favourable to them at the time. We are in a space where there are important sources, and I will return to this later.

Violent Islamic Radicalisation

I will begin by making a number of useful general points. When studying the phenomenon of jihadism it is essential to remember that identifying and drawing up the profile of a typical jihadist is an extremely difficult exercise. There is no such thing as a typical profile because jihadism and radicalisation in this context develop through the interaction between different factors: those factors which are local and specific to the individual in his environment and those factors which are linked to the international context. This interaction is important as it determines whether or not the individual will become radicalised. If, therefore, we have a multiplicity of local and international factors, there is a combination of factors which cannot produce typical profiles.

A combination of several factors is therefore necessary. A person doesn't become radicalised simply because they come from an underprivileged background. The key factors are still essentially political and religious. There has to be the influence of a political discourse or a religious discourse in order for an individual to turn to radicalisation and violence. This is not to say that no other factors exist, but I suggest that if we wish to classify the factors in some kind of hierarchy we need first of all to focus on politico-religious discourse. And as I have already pointed out, economic precarity alone cannot systematically lead to radicalisation and violence. We find people who are more or less integrated, have a social capital, are educated and yet have been radicalised. We find people who live in underprivileged conditions, with problems in their social or family environment who have also been radicalised.

All this needs to be borne in mind since we tend too often to assume that if a person is poor, an immigrant and a Muslim, then there is a good chance they will become radicalised. Yet as we can see this is not the case and we have many examples from other countries, especially those where the percentage of radicalised individuals in the jihadist movements is high, as in Saudi Arabia, for instance, where these individuals do not necessarily come from underprivileged backgrounds, do not live in precarious social and economic conditions but have turned to violence. Between 2500 and 3000 Saudis have left for jihad. There is a factor which is that of education, an internal factor and which is not necessarily economic.

There would not be any jihadism if there wasn't a favourable context the discourse can latch on to. There have been a number of events over the last 20 years which have structured global Islamism and which can help explain these crises and why jihadism is thriving today. From Afghanistan in the 80s to the uprisings in Arab countries in 2011 a certain number of events have structured the Arab-Muslim world and stimulated jihadism: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the crises in countries such as Yemen, the Sahel, Somalia, the war in Iraq in 2003, the Bosnian and Chechnyan crises and, underlying all this, Afghanistan which, for 30 years, has been a strong magnet. Today the Arab uprisings and their consequences, combined with the breakdown of some of the states in this Arab world, the collapse of the Libyan State, the collapse of the state and the revolution in Tunisia have also led to major upheaval.

Even more serious, the collapse of Yemen today has provided an example which is being copied in the Syro-Iraqi region. The Syrian State has collapsed and the minority regime is in a very difficult position. Iraq is still very unstable and has been since 2003; with the events in 2011-2012 there has been a return of Islamic State.

All these events fuel the radical discourse which in turn energises jihadist activity today. It is essentially conflict zones which are affected and which create poles of attraction. For a long time Afghanistan was one such pole, followed by Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq in the first decade of the 21st century, Yemen, the Palestinian territories and Syria. In all of these conflicts today, it is the absence of a lasting political solution over the last 30 years which continues to fuel jihadist discourse. Until a lasting political solution to these conflicts is found, jihadism will continue to develop and to flourish. Preventive policies can be introduced at the level of each conflict, but as long as there is an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a Syria or an Iraq, the preventive policies will be efficient but will not be able to contain the phenomenon. Action at international level is therefore necessary too in order to achieve significant results.

As for the interaction between populations who have settled in the West and the influences in the conflict zones, in the period 1980-2000 we thought that the jihad in Afghanistan or in Chechnya was the problem of the Arab countries and Arab combatants. Since 2003, we have seen that the war in Iraq and the conflict in Syria have a real impact on European countries as hundreds if not thousands of people leave Europe to join the jihad in the conflict zones.

The impact is also much greater thanks to the social networks and excessive use of internet. Some of these movements have set up a permanent interaction between the conflict zones and the populations living a long way away but who feel concerned as a result of this virtual proximity to the Syrian, Palestinian and Yemeni conflicts.

A generational phenomenon

Jihadism has always functioned by generation. There was the Afghanistan generation in 1990 and 2001 which created a certain number of groups including Al Qaida in the mid-90s. Then we have the second generation of combatants and jihadists, the Iraq generation, which was born out of the US intervention in 2003 and which continued to feed off the Iraqi conflict up to 2010. A certain number of groups followed on from this, not necessarily directly from Iraq but which sought their inspiration in this conflict; they set up new groups on their own territories. This Iraq generation was important as it provided the foundations and the basis for what was to come with the Arab uprisings and which was to lead to the third generation: people of between 16 and 20 who were too young to have known Afghanistan, but not too young to have known Iraq, even if they were only pre-teenagers or even young children at the time. Although they hadn't really known the jihad in Iraq in the period 2003-2010, they are the children of all these uprisings in Libya, in Syria, in Yemen and elsewhere, all of which received enormous coverage on the internet.

It is this generation which is fighting in Syria. The Iraq generation is in command and the Afghanistan generation represents individuals who are now in their fifties, sixties or even seventies. They have distanced themselves from jihadism. Some are still charismatic figures but very few active members are left in this generation. The Iraq generation is that of the leader of Islamic State, the head of AQIM, of AQAP. In the next 10 years the new generation may gain experience, continue to fight and become hardened combatants, and possibly become the leaders of tomorrow's jihadist movements.

The case of Syria and Iraq

I am now going to focus on these conflicts as they are the key factor today in the radicalisation process. These conflicts have led to a phenomenon which has never been seen before in terms of its consequences and the number of combatants that will join organised structures. Whereas in Afghanistan and in Iraq there were at most between 2000 and 5000 foreigners who travelled to these areas to fight, what we have in Syria and in Iraq are roughly 15,000 or more foreign fighters, plus all the local combatants in the different groups. We see a mass phenomenon which didn't exist before. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, with an impact on young people living in France and not only those who have been tempted by jihad in Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq or elsewhere. Several elements explain the attraction of jihad in Syria.

First of all, remember that it is a combat that the jihadist movements put centre stage through its multi-

faceted character. That is to say that if you go and fight in Syria it means you are going to fight the Alawites, a sect which is considered to be heretical in the eyes of Islam and which is in power. It also means that you are going to fight the Shiites, who are allies of the Alawites, and so the Iranians, the Hezbollah, the Shiite militia who are considered by radical Sunni Islam to be apostates or renegades. Shiites aren't even considered to be true Muslims since they rejected the arbitration of the period of the first Caliphs and preferred to follow the Caliph Ali, and so are considered to have rejected the Sunna.

It means fighting the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime. Westerners who, either because of their inaction or because of their action against Islamic State are considered today to be a burden and therefore are enemies. Even if the West were to provide much more support for the Syrian uprising they would still be considered as enemies because they could be accused of supporting the wrong part of the uprising. Any intervention on the part of the West is clearly seen as outside interference and therefore as an enemy.

And then there is always the ever-present spectre of Israel and so fighting in Syria means preparing the jihad of tomorrow which will be the jihad against Israel since we are right at the borders of this country. Thus, forcing Syria to join the Caliphate today means preparing the confrontation with Israel in order to free the Palestinian territories, which remains a leitmotif and a major dynamic.

The second element is the ease with which one can reach the theatres of war, which was unknown in the past. Although it was possible to get to Bosnia, Chechnya or Afghanistan it wasn't very easy and for many it was out of reach. It meant building networks, and the systems of transport weren't practical.

Today all you need to do is buy a plane ticket to Istanbul and you are almost in Syria, even if the Turkish authorities seem to want to control their borders more strictly. In other words, it is still easy to make one's way to Syria. Turkey is at the gateway to Europe and therefore so is Syria.

Through the social media, mobilisation has increased, and one talks of jihad 3.0. Thanks to this mobilisation the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts have been given global media coverage in a way that wasn't possible in the days of traditional media. The Afghan jihad and the Chechnyan jihad were not at all in this logic. Iraq was already part of the internet era but with Syria we have made a quantum leap thanks to the social media and this has produced a mass phenomenon.

And then we have something which tends to be considered less significant but which is in fact important. It is the production of a narrative which is very important for Syria: the prophetic narrative. Many young people go to Syria because they are convinced that Syria is a special place in the prophecy of the end of time in Islam. The construction of this prophecy of the end of time creates a strong and exalted sense of identity which echoes a certain number of other elements that we have seen in the history of Islam and which incites young people to leave for Syria, convinced that this is where the final combat against the enemies of Islam will be fought. The last fight before the end of time; the fight which will deliver Jerusalem and see the coming of the Messiah who will fight the antichrist. This prophetic narrative will persuade individuals that their salvation will be achieved if they die as martyrs en route for Syria, which is the ultimate place to fight the enemies of Islam.

This phenomenon is unequalled and had never before been seen in jihadist theatres of war. The recent statistics from March 2014 on the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq show that it is a mass phenomenon well above 15,000 foreign fighters. The figures for countries of the Middle East are very high, especially when we take the ratio of foreign fighters to the size of the population into account. Tunisia is particularly affected by the phenomenon, with 3000 foreign fighters for a population of fewer than 15 million inhabitants. Saudi Arabia is also greatly affected, as are Jordan and Morocco. As for the West, France is almost the number one country for young jihadists leaving for Syria or Iraq, along with Great Britain and the Benelux countries. This international phenomenon stretches from North America to Europe, via the Middle East and goes as far as Asia and Central Asia, and is an unprecedented global phenomenon.

Syria and Iraq are very important as there is also an ideological fight between the jihadists themselves. Today jihadism is bipolar. Some individuals support Al Qaida, others support Islamic State. Two essential points have to be made here.

First, there is a leadership contest among those vying for influence, and among those vying for allegiance. The relationship between the chiefs and the charismatic leaders is truly conflictual.

Secondly, there is a phenomenon of emulation and competition. Interestingly, the areas where Al Qaida is the strongest, the Sahel, Algeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen and Asia, are the areas where Islamic State is trying hardest to establish itself. Ultimately, one could ask oneself whether the presence of one of the two groups acts as a brake on the hegemony of the other.

This bipolarity is also something that many countries are examining in their search for elements which could be used to weaken the jihadist movement by stigmatising this bipolarity in such a way as to force the groups into an internal conflict which would weaken both of them instead of stimulating them and reinforcing them. This approach is often adopted by countries in the region, Saudi Arabia, for instance, or Jordan, but not so much by European countries which don't really understand this bipolarity and are geographically more remote from this region.

In simplistic terms, we could say that this bipolarity comes down to two spheres of influence.

Al Qaida

Today we have a sphere which we call Al Qaida, made up of a core and affiliated groups. First and foremost, this sphere has a transnational approach, in other words global jihad. The ideal is still one of Salafist jihad but, unlike Islamic State, Al Qaida doesn't seek to proclaim a Caliphate and wants to expand through the Emirates or through the influence of networks, of franchises which are called Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This movement has a highly centralised hierarchy with a communications council. The council is a vector of communication on the internet. It has a strong presence in Yemen, North Africa, Syria, Somalia and the Sahel region and has created a branch on the Indian sub-continent.

Islamic State

There are major differences between Islamic State and Al Qaida. Firstly, unlike Al Qaida, Islamic State is territory-based. Al Qaida has always been a diffuse movement within the global jihad and has rarely been territorial or only for very brief periods. Today, contrary to Al Qaida, we know where the territory of Islamic State lies: Syria and Iraq, its main stronghold. Furthermore, it is a movement which seeks to expand to other regions, through the Caliphate, and the system functions on the basis of allegiances.

A number of declarations of allegiance have been made since the proclamation of the Caliphate, first of all in Algeria, Libya, the Pakistani-Afghan region, the Sinai, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Today the organisation, which is highly decentralised through administrative divisions, covers a vast territory and is present in countries going from West Africa to Afghanistan. It is through these declarations of allegiance that Islamic State reinforces its influence. The most recent is Boko Haram, thus enabling Islamic State to extend its influence to the confines of Nigeria.

Al Qaida doesn't enjoy the same range of influence since Islamic State functions with groups which are truly territory-based and which are in the process of controlling territories, cities and populations and which is thus expanding its influence. For example, Islamic State in Syria and Iraq represents 10 or so governorates in Iraq and 7 governorates in Syria. This huge presence through the governorates is specific to this region. Then we have the expansion of Islamic State from the Sinai to Nigeria. Allegiances are proclaimed and today Islamic State can truthfully say that it is present in the Sinai, Libya, Algeria, in a very small group in Asia, and in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Lebanon.

The great strength of this organisation is that even if it doesn't enjoy a massive presence on these territories, it is present in the form of very small groups and is capable of creating a sentiment of fear and a force of attraction through its extremely well orchestrated media presence on the internet. We thus have the impression that the organisation is present worldwide, with a global influence. Today, for example, Islamic State claimed responsibility for two explosions in Saudi mosques in the Eastern Province, barely a few hours after the attack, and also claims the creation of a governorate in the central region of Saudi Arabia.

Does Islamic State govern or administer this region? No, but its presence thanks to internet and the fact that

it can claim responsibility for an act as soon as it has occurred enables it to establish its presence on this territory. In a similar fashion, Islamic State has established itself in Libya. Islamic State does not control Tripoli, it practically controls part of the city of Berna and part of the city of Sirte and the outskirts of Nofaliya. In other words three small cities in Libya and yet all we hear about is Islamic State in Libya, even though it is only represented by approximately 1500 combatants. But Islamic State is capable of developing its communication so professionally that we get the impression that all we see in Libya is Islamic State, despite the fact that other groups are also present. In this way the policy adopted makes this organisation very attractive.

In what way is this organisation attractive?

First of all, it is an organisation which plays on the Caliphate effect, which has enabled it to attract a very young generation, and we are often struck by the youth of those who go to fight for Islamic State. Whereas the average age of combatants fighting for Al Qaida is 22 to 26 years of age, those fighting for Islamic State are 18 to 21 years old.

After the latest events in Saudi Arabia with the explosions in the mosques in the Eastern Province, the Saudi authorities published a list of wanted activists and arrested several hundred of them from among radical group militants.

What really struck me was the youth of those who were arrested: 16 to 20-year-olds. In other words what we have today is a generation of young people who join up at around 15 years of age, whereas in the Al Qaida period militants started out at the age of 22, on average. It is striking to observe leaders of networks with a dozen or so militants under their command who are barely 20 years old. What we see is the extreme youth of Islamic State militants, which can be explained in particular by the existence of the Caliphate. The Caliphate was suspended at the beginning of the 20th century and its reintroduction represents an ideal for Muslims and for some radical Muslims this ideal has become a reality.

When we speak of Islamic State we have the image of victory on the march. Islamic State has taken control of the region of Iraq, it is expanding in Syria, the Sinai, Libya, Yemen and Nigeria. Just how far can and will Islamic State expand?

This dynamic of victory on the march is principally due to this far-reaching and extensive expansion. It is not intensive, it is not like waves of militants or a landslide which sweeps away everything in its path. What we have are small groups which are important but which don't have the intensity to attract entire populations to follow this ideal. And in spite of recent defeats in Kobane, thanks to this dynamic of victory the reputation of indestructibility enjoyed by Islamic State has not been damaged, since they immediately launched successful offensives and captured Palmyra in Syria. Thanks to their successes in Libya they have continued to ride on the wave of victory.

They also have an excellent mastery of online communication, unknown in all other similar organisations. The different divisions of Al Qaida had just one committee responsible for the media, i.e. a structure in charge of disseminating their ideas and ideology on the internet. These groups usually have one committee, no more. Today Islamic State has a dozen or so media committees who are responsible for the dissemination of their ideas 24/24, and this is what has increased significantly Islamic State's capacity to disseminate and propagate its ideas on the internet. The communiqués follow a standard format which is reproduced through a dozen committees, all of which only publish official Islamic State information. It is thus thanks to militants who are highly skilled in the use of internet and the media that the capacity to communicate has increased dramatically.

The radicalisation process is manifold. There are preachers, there are recruiters who have been specially trained and there are hackers who contribute their know-how. The content of what is preached and the way it is communicated via the social networks is extremely important. The main strength of the internet is that everything is dematerialised. Whereas the physical distribution of leaflets in front of mosques continues to reach only a limited number of people, the internet has become a media jihad and can mobilise people worldwide via the social networks. It represents a strike force which is incomparably more powerful than what was done in the 2000s. Today the internet has made the former propaganda tools obsolete and is now the main tool.

It is also a tool which enables the bipolarity between Al Qaida and Islamic State to flourish. Every single pro-jihadist website defines itself in function of one of these two groups.

There is also another important phenomenon which has resulted from the internet: the migration of activities to the social networks. Al Qaida started at a time where one had to set up a website, a forum where an information committee provided and disseminated all the information. Today Islamic State represents a dozen media committees via YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. All the social networks are used. The other groups also use these networks but Islamic State is the leader in the field. Messages can be sent out immediately and read simultaneously, and the increase in the dissemination of information means that many populations who were out of contact when only forums and websites existed can now easily be reached. Although the internet already existed in 2003, during the jihad in Iraq, if you wanted to be a self-proclaimed jihadist on the internet you had to have well-developed computer skills and actively search for information. Today all you need to do is to go on YouTube or Twitter to find “ready packaged” jihadist information. Even though these websites are targeted as part of a repressive policy to crack down on such activities and are regularly shut down, new accounts appear the very next day. Unless extremely tough restrictions are introduced to regulate the whole of the internet, we will never manage to bring this to an end as the jihadists and cyber users will always be one step ahead. And even though preventive measures are important, the jihadists are capable of adapting immediately.

We must also take on board the involvement of female jihadists in the communications and propaganda machine. In the 2000s this was marginal but it is gradually increasing and more and more female jihadists play a role in the propaganda war. We find them in front of their screens ready to transmit information, create websites, set up accounts. In particular they work behind the scenes in the support networks for prisoners, for example in Saudi Arabia, which use Twitter a lot. Despite the restrictions placed on women in the work place, many of them have shown a real enthusiasm in working behind the scenes of the social networks.

This strong presence of Islamic State on the web has naturally encouraged these groups to invent a new weapon which is far more strategic: the cyber-weapon. Terrorist attacks are no longer only committed using classical weapons; today, information and news services and sources, plus all the digital structures are attacked thanks to a newly acquired digital competence which has led to cyber-attacks such as the recent attack on TV5 Monde, for example. They have only just begun to develop their ability to carry out cyber-attacks and they are highly adaptable and reactive.

The internet can be used not only to disseminate material for the radicalisation process but also to provide help and support for the operational side of radicalisation. We can find tutorials on how to make explosives and weapons. Today these methods are within everybody’s reach whereas in the 2000s they were more difficult to find and so only reached a limited number of people.

Politico-religious discourse

In order to identify this discourse, it should be pointed out that it takes different forms. What is the hard drive of a jihadist today?

The first thing is that violent action must be given priority and is necessary to challenge the political system in place, whether Muslim or not. It is what is known as the principle of transgression of obedience to the State. A jihadist is a revolutionary and wants to overthrow existing regimes through the use of violence.

The second is exclusivism and the rejection of everything which is not part of Islam. The jihadist combat must be fought against non-Muslims, apostates and Western values. Jihadists have the impression they are surrounded by enemies. For them, whatever is alien to Islam perverts the image of Islam and its purity.

The third is the defence of Muslim territories. In their eyes, Muslim territories are occupied today, with the exception of the Caliphate.

This occupation is due either to political regimes in the pay of the West or to ungodly or irreligious regimes, or to foreign powers. Islamic values must be defended through the use of arms, and it is here that we see what is considered to be defensive jihad, where it is a matter of defending territories, and offensive jihad, which is a question of extending the Caliphate to other regions and countries.

The fourth and last element is the rejection of traditional religious practice. Radical jihadists are against moderate Muslims and against the majority structuring form of Islam. Their attitude is one of exclusivism, and in their eyes they are the only true Muslims. All other Muslims have either strayed or are apostates who have forsaken Islam. There is no such thing as a moderate Muslim. Either they are apostates or they have strayed or they are infidels. A fight has to be fought against apostate regimes, as with the principle of Takfir.

Dissemination and impact of the discourse

The first level is made up of public space where the discourse can append itself. Then we have individuals who will play a role and enable the development of social links via tribes, clans, families and networks of friends. The third level is more internalised and is made up of traumatic psychological effects related to the family environment or to prison and which lead to the mutation and radicalisation of the person.

So we have three levels where the discourse can be transmitted and disseminated. It is no easy matter to identify these three levels, which means that when we have an overall picture of the radicalisation process it is difficult to intervene on just one or two vectors. The difficulty is to have a global discourse, to have a programme of actions at the different levels. Firstly because if we want to stop or bring a halt to radical discourse then we will first of all have had to examine thoroughly the interpretation radicals have of their religion, which we have already seen today. It is also necessary to have a policy to monitor the activities of preachers and activists.

Then we have vectors about which I have serious reservations, in particular concerning the policing of the internet. This action may have certain virtues but will never be able to contain the dissemination of jihadist discourse in its entirety.

Furthermore, policing or monitoring political discourse is becoming more and more difficult. How can we deradicalise the context of the Middle-East through an impact on political discourse? The greatest difficulty lies here since people at a local level have no real influence; we are up against the power of the state which may possibly hold a different discourse in order to react to crises which are one of the sources of jihadism.

Monitoring or policing public space and networks is also extremely difficult. We cannot put a police officer behind every single person, we cannot police society at large, unless we set up an authoritarian state, which may encourage more radicalisation in reaction to this. If we take the case of Egypt, there is a risk of radicalisation of the upcoming generations as a result of the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and the extremely repressive policy which has been put in place by the Egyptian authorities.

We still have an Al Qaida and an Islamic State stronghold, a bipolarity which plays such an influential role through the franchises and groups of administrative regions that Islamic State claims it is responsible for. And then we have another level which is more a question of operational cells and militants. Then we have the sympathisers who are not necessarily part of an organisation. It is at this level that we find the most militants in the West. They aren't yet really active but are self-radicalised individuals who could easily move from theory to practice within a radicalisation process and actually commit attacks.

Anti-radicality policies

When considering the various policies on the fight against radicality, different questions can be asked. We have already said that a security-based approach would not only bring positive results. We have tougher laws concerning the internet, an increase in the number of stops and searches and arrests, the dismantling of networks, the removal of preachers, etc. All these approaches may bring results but cannot stop the movement because they don't eradicate it.

There are also political approaches which are much riskier and which are controversial but which may lead to a certain number of avenues to be explored. First I think a distinction should be made between the different types of radicalisation, which are not the same when they are violent and when they are religious and non violent, as in the case of quietist Salafism, for example. The distinction between violent and non-violent radicalisation is an important concept.

Is the giving up of recourse to violence a way to start a dialogue? Experiments have been carried out in the

United Kingdom to deal with movements which, to begin with, were not Islamist movements, in particular in Northern Ireland with the IRA. This was also tried with far left movements.

Following the publication of a report on jihadist networks in France, we learned through the press of the Danish formula which is based on a far more comprehensive approach to radicalism.

Will an evolutive reading of events which occur in the Arab world help bring a halt to the process of violent radicalisation? Today, will promoting moderate Islamist forces help move to a dynamic of deradicalisation? In other words, should we rely on matrices such as the Muslim Brotherhood or others?

Would setting up certain channels of trust with States who have an influence over more or less moderate Islamist movements such as Qatar and Turkey today provide solutions, in particular with the conflict in Syria, and would it bear fruit?

How can we promote a counter-discourse on the internet? It is complex, but offers an avenue to be explored and if we want to promote a counter-discourse we have to work with religious authorities. Purely secular counter radicalisation is not enough to counter the discourse. We therefore need to work with authorities that are legitimate in the eyes of a certain number of Muslims, as is done in many Muslim countries.

How can we deconstruct the jihadist discourse? Can we do it with secular tools or should we do it using Islamic tools? Our Western societies have problems understanding the issues. We could find inspiration in what is done in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Tunisia. This could help understand how to deradicalise certain jihadists.

By reinforcing the legitimacy of partnerships set up with Muslim interlocutors and by giving greater precedence to our institutional Muslim interlocutors, we should be able to stop the current dichotomy between Al Qaida and Islamic State and, above that, between Shiites and Sunnis, from being the central element which structures the hard drives and the software of societies in the Middle East. The Shiite-Sunni bipolarity has a very structuring function in the Middle East and if we take sides in this bipolarity or if we rely more on one with respect to the other, we will see the consequences on the Sunni radicals in the Gulf countries and if we rely too much on the Gulf countries we will have problems with Iran. We have to have a balanced policy but at the same time it must be intuitive so as to have levers for action which will deradicalise this region.

The Western countries and the United States have an influence and could build up a stock of trust. Even if it may seem pretentious today to say that France or the United States could build up a stock of trust, this must be created in the Arab world. But how is it to be created? Maybe the Arab uprisings have been insufficiently understood. This historic moment in the societies in the Arab world has not been taken seriously enough in the West. There are consequences. Does the reinforcement of a policy of trust in the Arab world necessitate the promotion of a more pragmatic vision which is adapted to the context of a crisis situation and which is less ideological? Does it mean fewer allies among authoritarian regimes? More support for regimes in transition and which are considered to be less stable?

It is true that at a given moment this might strengthen jihadism but would it not be better today to help a country like Libya to get out of the situation in which it finds itself by supporting the authorities which are being put in place? Rather than closing one's eyes and putting one's head in the sand by letting this country sink into a state of chaos, which risks provoking dramatic consequences for the region and for Tunisia in particular?

Is the policy concerning Syria to consider the Syrian regime as a partner in the region? Is it still viable to consider this regime as a possible solution in the fight against Islamic State? I have great reservations on this lever for action; the Syrian regime is responsible for the situation and today is in a process of decomposition.

So what I have wanted to do in my presentation is to give an overview of the discourse and the possible ways of deradicalising people.

QUESTIONS

Mme Hourcade: Listening to you we can see that our actions and professions are of little consequence, since the most efficient forms of action would seem to be on a different level and not on the level where we work. Having said this, we have heard about the deradicalisation programme set up by Dounia BOUZAR. Is the mere fact that it is secular mean that this institution, created by the State, is doomed to fail? If the fact that it is secular ruins all chances of its being recognised or being seen as legitimate, can we say that we are on the wrong track in France?

M. Thomas: I don't have any statistics on the results announced by this Institute. I think there is room for more than one form of action. It isn't necessarily doomed to fail but it is insufficient. Methods can be complementary and one can have several forms of deradicalisation. We have something to contribute but this technique may soon run out of arguments when facing people who are very determined and who don't necessarily fit into a category or correspond to a profile that this structure has defined in advance by focusing on a person's social or family background or environment, on their professional history, on their economic capital. All of this is important but so is the discourse. The different deradicalisation processes I have observed in other countries have shown that there was not just one form of action and that several methods have to be considered. It is difficult for a country like France to imagine deradicalisation in the way that some other countries do, where they work with the religious authorities.

Today all those who face this problem at local level must have a minimum of understanding of what is going on in the world. This is essential if you want to understand why a thoughtful young man decides to turn to this form of action. Maybe the conflict in Syria goes beyond the remit of professionals who are faced with radicalisation, but being aware that everything is linked, that there is a discourse which attracts these young people, that there are different groups, that the fact of going to fight with one particular group and not with another makes a difference, all of this may help be more efficient and get better results. Even at local level knowledge is necessary in order to understand why an individual has gone to Syria.

Not everyone has detailed knowledge of the question and there are even young people who join a group without knowing what they are fighting for. Even among Islamists, many don't know what Islamism and Islam involve, especially in the West. During the terrorist attacks in January, for example, the situation was totally confused in a way we hadn't seen before, in that we had three individuals who had prepared a coordinated attack, with one claiming that he was acting in the name of Islamic State while the other two claimed that they were fighting for Al Qaida in Yemen. Why was there this divide between the three of them? It was how they had been initiated into Islamism, who they frequented and what they read which led them to choose one group rather than another.

All this must be borne in mind because everything is linked. I'm not saying that a secular view of things isn't efficient but that we also need many contextual elements which are important.

Juvenile court judge: I would like to pursue the question of the very limited local handling of the issues of minors who risk being radicalised. I was wondering what approach we should have in order to distinguish religious radicalisation from violent radicalisation. We receive referrals concerning children or adolescents who have been identified by the social services as showing signs of radicalisation but with the interpretation or fear of what this might lead to later on. For instance, I will be seeing a 17-year-old girl who has left school because she wears the full face veil and has therefore been expelled and whose attitude and discourse are those of religious radicalism. How can I see whether or not this radicalisation contains the germs of future violent action?

M. Thomas: In practice we are faced with specific cases and therefore must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Certain elements exist which will help us to understand which type of radicalisation it is. First of all there are external signs or a general attitude. So, dropping out of school, refusing to mix with others at school or elsewhere, systematically entering into a generational conflict with one's parents, castigating others, considering others as renegades or infidels, all of these are signs. Radicalisation is a break with society which is translated into actions, but they can be very varied as we have just seen. It could also include frequenting the mosque, fasting, respecting the five pillars of Islam. It is perfectly possible to be radical in terms of religious practice without necessarily turning to violence. Some Christians practise their religion in a way which is more radical than others, for example.

We can also focus on what young people read and who or what their references are. If someone says that what they read or understand comes from imams or preachers from major universities in Saudi Arabia, then we can consider that it is a case of quietist Salafism. It is a rigorous practice of religion but is not a commitment to militant jihadism. The majority of those involved in the institutions of Saudi religious establishment are highly critical of and also enemies of armed Islamic groups.

If we have a young girl who declares that in her opinion Shiites are renegades and are not Muslims, all Arab regimes are apostates and that we must support Islamic State, then we can worry that it is indeed a violent radicalisation.

Saying that she wishes to observe Ramadan and to wear the Islamic full face veil because she feels Muslim and that she wants to respect the rules and to pray is the radicalisation of religious practice but is not necessarily a violent radicalisation.

So we need to look at what they say, what their attitudes are, what they read and understand, what references they have. And so it is necessary to have basic but fairly detailed knowledge of the situation.

Mme Hourcade: If for example, there is a breakdown in the relations between parents and a young person, which goes beyond a normal adolescent crisis, could this be a warning sign?

M. Thomas: Yes and no. It could be a warning sign if the child turns to another source of authority, as soon as there is a break with the family environment. If this is the local mosque and the imam is someone who preaches a strict form of Islam but not jihad, then the young person won't be leaving for Syria.

If, on the contrary, the young person is looking for something and cannot find it in their close environment, among their friends, and if there has been a break with the family and if they have joined the mosque but it isn't what they are looking for, then there is the danger that the young person will look on the internet for other forms of discourse and will come across a human connector and will leave for Syria. Here we have a case of radicalisation. It is up to the intelligence services to inform you.

Mme Hourcade: We will now take all the other questions and then M. THOMAS will answer.

D. Pical, honorary judge: *I would like more information on a global level, that is to say on the development of Al Qaida, of Islamic State and what is going on in the attempt to take over Syria and Iraq. You said that the movement is extensive and not intensive. I don't know enough about how many jihadists there are and where they come from. There are of course those who come from Europe and North Africa. There are several thousand of them, as opposed to the millions of Muslims who live in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, etc. How come these States, which have armies, are incapable of stopping or arresting these jihadists? Why isn't there more resistance?*

In addition, concerning our country and the young people who become radicalised, you made particular mention of the development of social networks and we can imagine that in addition to the mosques and to friends, prison could also be a factor leading to radicalisation, in conjunction with the social networks. Is there no way that the French and European authorities could organise cyber-attacks on these networks?

Mme Saint Nazaire: I was wondering how the Caliphate functions?

Mme Lefevre, juvenile court judge in Paris: *We tend to put jihadism and sects in the same category. Do you think this is appropriate and can the methods used to try to get people, in our case young people, to leave sects be used for young people caught up in jihad?*

Assessor at the juvenile court in Paris: *I would like to know if you have any information on the civic education of imams en France.*

M. Thomas: We can say today that the phenomenon is on the increase and that this is constant. The different groups which claim to follow the jihadist matrices throughout the world represent tens of thousands of combatants. In Syria and Iraq the number of foreign fighters is estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000. The number of jihadist combatants is probably two to three times as many. In Syria and in Iraq there are probably between 50,000 and 100,000 combatants. In Yemen, an organisation such as AQAP represents roughly 2000

combatants, which is very low compared to the Yemeni population of 26 million inhabitants.

So how and why do these groups manage to function with fairly limited military means? Two important things need to be remembered. There are fewer and fewer States in the region and they are in the process of collapsing because they have been too authoritarian, not sufficiently legitimate or have not introduced enough reforms. They are being contested by a minority which has taken up arms and by a silent majority of the general populations which don't recognise themselves in these Arab regimes. There is a severe crisis in the governance of countries in the Arab world with corrupt and authoritarian leaders who have sown the seeds of the Arab uprisings. The Middle East is in the throes of a political crisis and is unstable. There is another factor, the Sunni-Shiite bipolarity which has created radicalism and will continue to do so with the conflicts we see today in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.

As for counter-radicalisation on the social networks, major operators such Facebook and YouTube have become aware of the problem, have closed down a large number of accounts and have introduced strict recommendations. However, many immediately open new accounts very easily. In order to avoid having one's account closed, individuals migrate to less popular websites and to much smaller social networks where the regulations and censorship are much reduced. It is a situation of constant adaptation.

As for the way the Caliphate functions, it is a territory-based structure and is highly decentralised. This is somewhat of a paradox, since Islamic State relies on many people who have simply changed allegiance. The city of Mossul has fallen; it represents 1,500,000 inhabitants, not all of whom are Islamic State militants. But the keys of the city have been given to people who know how to run a city and who have great animosity towards the Iraqi army and the Shiites. Similarly, the Raqqa region and the Eastern part of Syria have fallen into the hand of Islamic State as the result of the panic-induced compulsion (*fuite en avant*) and complete absence of any kind of management of the Bashar Al Assad regime.

And there is also the example of Sirte, Gaddafi's city in Libya, which today is in the hands of Islamic State because the inhabitants of Sirte don't want to be massacred and so just in order to survive have sworn allegiance to Islamic State. People living in these highly fragmented societies in the Middle East and who are left to their own devices have nothing left to lose. They rally around the strongest, who can provide security. With their ultra rigid and ultra violent politics Islamic State also offers a form of security to populations who are afraid of being killed. The level of violence in this region has reached levels never seen before and this is creating generations who will only have known a violent environment.

It is hardly surprising that Islamic State is an ultra violent movement since it originated in Iraq, the site of pogroms and Sunni-Shiite massacres. This environment has structured and nourished Islamic State.

Although the Caliphate isn't really a true Caliphate, their ability to communicate is such that they give the impression of being good administrators even though they have given the keys of the cities to those who already had them, the only difference being that these people have changed allegiance. What will become of the populations who are exposed daily to the practices of Islamic State, if the cities are liberated? There will be problems, that's for sure.

As for sects, it is an avenue to be explored. We need to see how the sects function and see if this can be transposed to the phenomenon of radicalisation. There is indeed an exclusive and sectarian side which is similar to what we find with Salafists.

- *Why is France the country which provides the biggest number of jihadists?*

M. Thomas: We must look at this in demographic terms. Quantitatively speaking, France is number one, but if we look at it in terms of the ratio of the general population to the Muslim population we obtain a ratio which is no higher than in Belgium. I recommend the book by the journalist David THOMSON, *The French Jihadists*, in which he stands back from the phenomenon and tries to paint a portrait of typical jihadists who have gone to fight. His approach is not an ideological one.

Mme Hourcade: *We would like to thank you very much, M. Thomas, for your presentation.*

Action plans introduced by the Directorate of the Juvenile Protection Service (PJJ)

Catherine SULTAN

In the face of the problems of radicalisation we have already participated in government action in terms of collaboration and the prevention of the risk of minors leaving for jihad. Since the terrorist attacks in January 2015 and the subsequent programme planned by the government, this collaboration has increased. The Juvenile Protection Service (PJJ) was invited to contribute and has developed a two-pronged action plan corresponding to two objectives.

Firstly, the PJJ participates in those government programmes where it was already active, that is to say an education department responsible for implementing court decisions. Its second objective is to consider how to prevent radicalisation and the influence or sway jihadists have over certain adolescents. How should we adapt our responses to situations which are difficult for professionals to deal with? This second aspect is essential as we are a government service which works with young people and in particular those who have multiple problems and are especially vulnerable.

Given these two objectives, we have set up a detailed training programme for the next three years so that all professionals working in the field of the judicial protection of juveniles can receive training concerning the issue of radicalisation at the National School for the Judicial Protection of Juveniles (*École Nationale de la Protection de la Jeunesse*). It was up and running very quickly, with trainers being the first to benefit, before being extended to others. It is a heavy commitment but is a response to the demand of professionals working in the field of the judicial protection of juveniles who are looking for support and answers to a certain number of questions. These courses are open to people working in accredited voluntary sector structures too.

In answer to the professionals' request for ongoing support after training, we have also set up a framework to clarify the rules and references when intervening within the context of the juvenile protection service. In particular, there is the question of the right of juveniles we are involved with to *laïcité* (secularism). What are the applicable rules, what are the references that professionals can rely on in situations which are very complex? We are talking in terms of education, everyday living, and things must be clarified and explicit. Although we have been working on these questions for a long time in our institution, this clarification is more recent. It is mainly a question of definitions which need to be examined and then shared.

Working groups within the PJJ have prepared guidelines for regulations on the functioning of all the services involved in the field of the judicial protection of juveniles and which cover all aspects of the rights and duties of professionals, and of adolescents when they are under the responsibility of the PJJ. These were adopted very recently and provide a reference that each service can adapt to its own needs and specificities.

In addition to the training programmes, the action plan for the prevention of radicalisation also involves the introduction of an observatory of people whose role is to gather and also to provide information. It is made up of a network of liaison officer on matters of *laïcité* (secularism) and citizenship. This network is headed by a chief officer at the directorate of the PJJ, and a liaison officer for each interregional directorate and each territorial directorate.

The responsibilities of liaison officers for *laïcité* (secularism) and citizenship:

To have good detailed knowledge of the phenomenon through the gathering of information provided anonymously in order to dispose of elements to be analysed and then used to adapt proceedings for those under our care.

To participate in intergovernmental meetings and bodies working on these questions, in particular the units set up to collaborate with the *Préfet*, where the PJJ has already been working since they were set up at the beginning of 2014.

To work with and contribute to the prevention programmes in all the voluntary sector associations

and places where these questions are discussed so that the PJJ has a place where it can really get to know the environment in which juveniles live their lives and so that it can rely on the resources there. There is a family dimension which is important but also the environment of the juvenile.

To enhance and diversify the working practices of the professionals. In other words, to go out and look for resources and to provide support for the teams. It is not the liaison officer who provides this support but he or she is the person who puts in place systems and resources from outside the PJJ to counsel and advise those of us who need it with respect to the problems we encounter.

For this we have been allocated a budget of 900,000 euros to finance outside interventions, be they consultations, expert advice, etc. Sometimes it is complicated to bring in people from the outside and we have to make a case for funding, whereas here the money has been earmarked and the liaison officers can use it to enable us to implement those measures that the courts ask the PJJ to implement.

To make this action plan work, additional members of staff have been recruited, in particular psychologists, a pluridisciplinary approach being essential if we want to improve the way we assess and understand the situation adolescents find themselves in and if we want to provide a sympathetic ear and help them in difficult and complicated situations. Full time positions have been created for 82 psychologists and whereas previously there was only one half-time psychologist per residence, today it will be a full-time post. Other sensitive places will benefit from similar increases.

In conclusion, there is the clear desire that those who intervene in the judicial protection of juveniles should be capable of adapting to the diverse needs of the different territories and issues specific to them and that they should be better informed of the environment juveniles grow up in when they don't live with their families.

QUESTIONS

Mme Hourcade: *Having listened to our speakers this morning, I was wondering whether it would be conceivable for the PJJ, when it is trying to adapt to a given situation and needs to understand the context in which radicalisation is taking place, to ask imams who do not advocate or promote the use of violence for advice. I feel that when it comes from Muslims it has maybe a greater impact than when it comes from defenders of laïcité (secularism).*

Mme Sultan: For me the liaison officers for *laïcité* are guardians of the ethics of the outside interventions and guarantee that they are consistent with our actions.

Mme Hourcade: *The question is whether or not we should have recourse to religion in order to try and counter these movements which claim that they are acting in the name of religion.*

Mme Sultan: I think this has already been the case in the different care hostels. Moreover, if a young person wishes to practise his or her religion, it is their right and we must enable them to do so. Furthermore, when we have recourse to outside interventions it is perfectly possible to invite someone from one or other religion, if this is appropriate. It can be extremely efficient as a pedagogical tool. But first of all I think we need to define our objectives. This question may well disturb and disrupt society, even more so when adolescents are involved, so what we must do is to be the guardians of ethics and of the right position. This is the role of the liaison officers for *laïcité*, i.e. a place to find support and a place to examine and think about the question. This is why it is necessary to rely on clearly identified outside interventions and which offer sufficient guarantees.

Mme Lefèvre, juvenile court judge in Paris: *Why the term "liaison officers for laïcité", given that all social workers at the PJJ are non religious (laïc), and so is the institution?*

Mme Sultan: We are talking of liaison officers for *laïcité* and citizenship. The aim of these two terms is to make this position commonplace. The question that our institution has been asked is how we fit into the government action plan for the prevention of radicalisation. I am happy with this term, it is pretty clear and doesn't create too much of a stigma.

Mme Hourcade: *Although I am not part of the PJJ, I get the impression that this term refers to professionals who do not share these values, even though this is an obligation for all professionals.*

Mme Sultan: That is not how I understand it. It is true that the PJJ is currently being audited by inspectors from the ministry on this issue and they want to see how we take on board these questions which disturb the whole of society and how we at the PJJ tackle this kind of problem. The issue is to know how an educational institution handles a question which is troubling French society. When we take into care young adolescents in a strict framework, at a time where they are going through their adolescent crisis, these questions arise daily and are all the more sensitive for that.

Mme Hourcade: *We can understand the difficulties, since what we heard this morning shows that it is a difficult task.*

Mme Atias, lawyer: *You mentioned meetings between the Préfet and the PJJ. What does this involve, exactly? I was also wondering about how the rights of the families and the children are taken into account. I think that families should be involved when their children have problems with the law.*

Mme Sultan: In 2014 two circulars set up units on the initiative of the *préfets* in which the prosecution service and other departments such as the PJJ are also involved. It is not therefore just a question of meetings between the *préfet* and the PJJ, but is a place to find information and provide answers to families who are facing up to difficult situations. The same circulars also raise the question of court orders not to leave the country. What can we do to anticipate such situations? The PJJ became involved back in 2014, today these units have been generalised. The PJJ respects the rules of confidentiality and court warrants, so it is the judges who receive the reports.

Mme Alain, juvenile court judge in Rouen: *We receive very few referrals for cases where such concerns are raised. But we have received referrals requesting educational assistance and I would like to talk about the rights of the families. The court intervenes in cases of parental neglect which compromise the development of the child. I can think of two cases where the parents had not failed in their duty as parents and had taken the initiative, as the child's legal guardian, to apply for an order not to leave the country. The juvenile had already been put under judicial protection and was the subject of an educational supervision procedure. The prosecution service asked me to replace the parents by making the juvenile a ward of court, without even having checked to see whether the parents had applied for an order not to leave the country. I am afraid of things getting out of hand and worry that things are being taken out of our jurisdiction, in particular with respect to the rights of the families who haven't failed in their duties but where a referral is nevertheless made to the juvenile court judge.*

Mme Sultan: In cases we know about, we have a lot of educational assistance measures with parents who have applied for support even though they had done their very best towards their children. We also have parents who cannot cope with their adolescent children and who need the courts to intervene. Then there is the situation of very young children whose parents are considering leaving for Syria; this is another type of situation with its own complications. We also have situations where the juvenile is monitored as the result of a criminal offence for related facts.

- *Can the liaison officer for laïcité be consulted on specific points as an outside advisor?*

Mme Sultan: The PJJ must be a resource centre for these questions, but the liaison officers won't intervene directly when a juvenile is the subject of measures. However, they do have a role to play in terms of advice, support and when reorienting the juvenile and have a role to play with the relevant establishments. With this network we are in contact with all the institutions and services which deal with this issue.

Mme Hourcade: *Do you have any statistics for the situations that have been referred to you?*

Mme Sultan: We are currently developing a tool precisely for this. In March we had reached sixty or so situations which are extremely varied, and there are probably more. The taskforce which has been set up is a way of getting much more reliable information. We haven't yet recruited all the liaison officers for *laïcité* and so the tool isn't yet really effective.

Mme Lefèvre: *Have you developed a methodology or criteria to identify young people who are in the*

process of radicalisation so as to be able to intervene as appropriate?

Mme Sultan: We are at the stage where we are in contact with researchers, and we draw on the modules already in use in other bodies and associations. We haven't yet drawn up our methodology and are still at the stage of collecting information and know-how. We shouldn't make things appear normal but neither should we put the spotlight on them. We have to deal with complex situations. Juvenile justice has always involved extreme situations. We have no intention of changing our points of reference and the way we work. One has to know how to analyse a symptom in order to work on the causes. The causes are varied, they aren't unique, we won't have a pre-established list but no doubt warning signs which we will gradually integrate into our working practices.

Mme Hourcade: *It is true that it can't be easy for services to denounce situations they have intervened in. It's not really part of social workers' culture or habits.*

Mme Sultan: We are not asking social workers to do anything more than to refer a juvenile who is in danger to the juvenile court judge and to the prosecution service.

M. Pical, honorary judge: *You have told us about staff numbers and training courses and I would like to know something about the content of these courses. You have spoken about laïcité and citizenship but how does this differ from what all social workers are supposed to do in their everyday work? Secondly, the PJJ deals with these questions, fine, but in the meantime a certain number of young people are in prison, they also have the right to practise their religion, and this is where the problem of the participation of an imam comes up again.*

Mme Sultan: To answer the second question, it isn't a matter of choice but the right of juvenile detainees. They have the same rights as adult prisoners but with a bit more protection. Moving back to the first one, if we examine how everyone defines neutrality and *laïcité* we see just how complex these notions are. So it isn't a question of reinventing anything but rather a question of making things clear, clarifying things, and providing support for professions which are more exposed than others.

M. Zennou, Director General of the association SOS jeunesse (SOS Young People): *How do you intend to integrate private sector associations in the action plan you have described?*

Mme Sultan: The training courses are open to associations. From my point of view this sector, whose missions correspond to those laid down in the 1945 Order (*Ordonnance de 1945*), is concerned by the whole of the programme since you are responsible for juveniles who have been put in your care by juvenile court judges. So you are involved in the same way as the public sector.

Mme Grelot, social worker with the PJJ: *Someone spoke about things getting out of hand and that is what we are also afraid of. Not with respect to what the PJJ Directorate has set up but with respect to inter-ministerial representatives, that it to say that since the 2007 law on the prevention of delinquency there is the sharing of information and that worries us a great deal. Especially as we know that information may be transmitted which has nothing to do with violent radicalisation. In concrete terms, if a young person buys a prayer mat, does this mean that he should be reported? Isn't there a risk of stigmatisation for young people who at some point were more religiously observant but who are not caught up in the radicalisation process?*

Mme Sultan: I think that by clarifying things and accompanying those involved, we should be able to find the right answers based on real information. The aim is that no one should find themselves alone in the face of complex situations. Some professionals reject out of hand anything to do with religion and think that a juvenile has no religious rights in a residence or that there are forms of behaviour which raise suspicions of proselytism. These fears exist and the fact of sharing the same basic philosophy or ground rules is a good way to prevent things getting out of hand without falling into the trap of accepting things as normal or having a blinkered view of things.

New judicial challenges?

A multidisciplinary analysis of the complexity of the phenomenon

Round table moderated by Thierry BARANGER, President of the juvenile court of Paris

Presentation by Thierry Baranger

This morning we focused mainly on a sociological and political approach to movements linked to radicalism. I would like to remind everybody that today's conference is not only about Islam but also about how adolescents structure their identities with respect to religion and *laïcité*. Fethy Benslama will tell us what jihadism has to offer and what expectations it responds to, and Laurent Bonelli will present some considerations on radicalisation and how the institutions and authorities respond.

Many aspects of the radicalisation process remain obscure. During the second part of our conference we are going to ask researchers from different disciplines to examine the new challenges facing the juvenile justice system when dealing with the processes of radicalisation. The second round table will bring together practitioners, judges, social workers and clinical psychologists to discuss concrete action on the ground around this issue. As Catherine Sultan so rightly said, juvenile justice – and the educational culture on which it is based – offers a real know-how in this domain. Its experience in the framework of educational assistance, when faced with incestuous families, peer groups and sects, ought to be better harnessed. Its knowledge of the relationship an adolescent has to death and risk-taking is equally valid for young fundamentalists who go out to war zones.

The advantage of this preventive approach is that it avoids an exclusively repressive reading of the situation, which is extremely restrictive, especially when it feeds off the “war against terrorism” type of discourse, as Laurent BONELLI pointed out in a recent article (*Les chemins de la radicalisation*, Le monde diplomatique, February 2015).

Marie-Pierre Hourcade mentioned a working group which has been set up in Paris, with researchers from different disciplines: psychologists, psychoanalysts, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and practitioners. The group, which was created on the initiative of Denis Salas, Laurent Bonelli and myself, took as its starting point the fact that Paris has national jurisdiction over the fight against terrorism and therefore over minors who might embark on this form of delinquency. True, it is a marginal phenomenon, but about 15 minors have been brought before the courts since 2014 for conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. It is in this context that we have invited practitioners (investigating judges, juvenile court judges, prosecutors and social workers) and researchers to exchange ideas around situations where the courts become involved (looking at various dossiers, observing what goes on during the hearings) both in the criminal court and in cases of educational assistance. On the basis of our professional competencies, we will try to reconstitute the very varied profiles and the dynamics which lead some people into terrorism and compare them with other cases where people shift from words to actions, which juvenile justice is more familiar with.

Laurent Bonelli is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Paris X Nanterre, co-editor of the review *Culture et Conflits* and a specialist in questions of urban security and the fight against terrorism. He has also been very interested in juveniles and has analysed the trajectory of three populations of young delinquents who were all brought before a juvenile court in the Paris area. He wonders what has become of them. His starting point was to study cohorts of adolescents known to the court, which is a court for 15-year-olds, using the dossiers prepared in the context of educational assistance and also those prepared in the context of criminal proceedings, over different periods (1996/2001/2006). He also analysed the relationship between this delinquency and public policies in criminal justice that were put in place at these times.

In addition to the article I have already mentioned (*Les chemins de la radicalisation*, *The paths to radicalisation*), he has written several books, one of which, *Au nom du 11 septembre* (In the name of September 11), analyses anti-terrorist policies in Europe.

Fethi Benslama is a philosopher and a psychoanalyst. He is Professor of Psychopathology at the University of Paris VII Diderot. He worked first of all as a clinical psychologist for the child welfare services in Seine Saint-Denis and has thought a lot about questions linked to the culture and health of migrants. More recently

he has considered the question of Islam, using psychoanalysis as a starting point, in particular in his book *La psychanalyse à l'épreuve de l'islam* (Psychoanalysis through the litmus test of Islam), and also in a pamphlet, *Déclaration d'insoumission à l'usage des musulmans et de ceux qui ne le sont pas* (Declaration of disobedience for the use of Muslims and of those who are not). Last but not least he has recently written a book, *La guerre des subjectivités en islam* (The war of subjectivities in Islam) in which he took stock of his work to see what psychoanalysis can contribute to the understanding of Islam.

Laurent BONELLI

Radicalisation is very much in the headlines today and everyone is talking about it. To quote someone working for French intelligence as an illustration: “there will soon be more people making a living from radicalisation than actual radicals”. Caricatural though this may seem, it is not totally false.

What I would like to do today is to share with you the thoughts and ideas of professionals working in child welfare, not so much because juveniles make up the majority of what we call radicals but because there is a legitimate concern for young people who will hit the headlines tomorrow after a terrorist attack. It will come as no surprise to you that the social worker and juvenile court judge who have already been involved in educational assistance proceedings concerning the individual will find themselves in a complex and awkward position. A legitimate question for these professionals is how to prevent young people from putting their words into action. This doesn't only concern terrorism but is a more general problem of delinquency, though of course, if it is a case of terrorism the consequences are far more tragic.

If we return to the recent terrorist attacks in France in January 2015 and if we look at the trajectories of the minors involved, then we do indeed see that they have a lot in common with the minors you have to deal with. If we look at their past and what they do with their lives there are great similarities with the populations you professionals work with. In a nutshell, the socio-judicial services are called in when the juvenile is still very young, he or she is taken into care and housed with a foster family or in a care hostel, they have an average or poor school record, they join gangs and get caught up in criminal activities, etc. So what we have are people who from a very young age have brushes with the law, are stopped or arrested by the police, have a criminal record and have served prison sentences. The Kouachi brothers were protected for a time as they had been taken into care and sent to a village in Corrèze, which saved them from the problems of adolescence while they were still young, but as soon as they arrived in Paris at the age of 18 they got caught up in a number of criminal networks.

We could add that if we look closely at all these individuals who have committed terrorist attacks on European soil, we see that they all follow a view of Islam which has been built around the image of fighter heroes, distant theatres of war, spectacular actions, that is to say a fairly simple ideology in which they can find their own concrete experiences, their incriminations, their exclusion, racism, the domination of their own people and that of other peoples such as the Palestinians, all of which is put together in a narrative about a civilisation where everything is the fault of the Jews and unbelievers. This simplistic vision offers two advantages: it explains a place in the world for those who believe it and is also a form of liberation since seeing the world in this way is a far nobler ideal than delinquency and marginality.

These characteristics which are common to these different individuals have already led to manic attempts to classify all of this. A certain number of experts talk of “gangsterterrorism”. I do not work with young people but I can imagine that for a professional who does, seeing this type of thing must be extremely worrying as the trajectories we are talking about here are not those of just five individuals, but of thousands, nay tens of thousands of young people. The characteristics we have described could indeed apply to many young people. So the question is not why these five individuals turned to violent action but why more young people don't do the same and commit terrorist attacks.

I would like to come back to how the social sciences can enlighten us on a certain number of points. One of the factors which is often mentioned to explain why people turn to violent action is the question of ideology. It could be the driving force behind these actions. We hear of individuals who become radicalised alone, via the internet. To quote the Minister of the Interior: “It is disconcertingly easy for any individual to acquire the minimum know-how necessary to commit a terrorist attack locally. The great change is in the way terrorist

groups exploit the possibilities offered by the new information technologies to inoculate the virus of terrorism into many minds”. But in reality the link between actual violence and ideology is not so clear.

Ideology is our way of seeing the world; it is the glasses that we put on in order to read the social reality. For individuals, the world can be divided in different ways, such as between rich and poor, capital and labour, French people and foreigners, believers and unbelievers. Depending on how we divide up the world, different alliances are formed, different strategies are created based on different analyses. Underground groups, radical organisations have a clear discourse on how the world is divided. To quote the first issue of *Dabiq*, which is an English-language magazine of Islamic State: “The world has been divided into two camps, the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of disbelief and hypocrisy”.

The ideology which guides our way of seeing the world has an impact. But it is very complicated to establish a direct link between adopting an ideological world view and turning to violent action. Many workers may well be convinced that the world is divided between capital and labour but this doesn’t mean that they are going to commit to a cause or carry out radical political actions. Generally speaking, armed groups complain about the passivity of the masses, yesterday workers, today Muslims. Omar Omsen is a recruiter and uses the internet to proselytise, in particular to get young people to join Al Nosra front in Syria.

If we listen to his speeches we see that he pinpoints two worlds: the active minority, the froth on the surface, and then the others, the apathetic Muslim masses who suffer and put up with things.

So if ideology is not the driving force which makes people turn to violent action, are deradicalisation programmes based on a religious counter-discourse efficient?

If we look back at the 70s, with the desire to deradicalise leftwing proletarian activists through the use of an ideological discourse, it would mean sitting left-wing proletarian activists down with a cadre from the French communist party and getting the latter to explain what communism is. Needless to say, the results would not be what was hoped for in terms of deradicalisation.

If we want to understand the challenge of radicalisation, the central question is not so much “why” but “how”. What are the micro-processes and connections which lead individuals into doing things they would never have thought of doing at an earlier stage in their lives?

We have realised that an individual slides gradually and often imperceptibly into the commission of violent acts. It is therefore extremely complicated to obtain workable profiles as we are not dealing with a general population with a typical profile.

There is one point which is completely ignored in debates on radicalisation, and that is the crucial role of public services, in particular the police and the system of justice, in the gradual slide towards radicalisation. All the studies that have been made of radicalisation processes in other periods of history have shown that radicalisation is based on personal relations. A person doesn’t become radicalised alone in front of the computer screen but is caught up in a dynamic of escalation.

If we look at the recent terrorist attacks in France, we can see that political violence doesn’t just suddenly appear out of nowhere. If we want to understand the situation we have to look at history. History can be seen at two levels. First on the individual level, with a know-how which has been tried and tested in other contexts and includes knowing where to find weapons and how to use them. It is no coincidence that Nemouche and Coulibaly were individuals who had already committed armed robberies. The way the attacks were carried out is not dissimilar to the way minor hold-ups are carried out, i.e. incompetent reconnoitring and a badly prepared escape plan. This modus operandi is light years away from that of the Red Brigades, for example, who organised their actions down to the last detail with hideouts, alternative cars and alternative escape plans. Whereas what we have here are young people who use what they have learnt elsewhere for terrorist reasons.

Links with personal histories are very important, for example the fact that Coulibaly had seen his best friend shot and killed by the police before his very eyes in 2000 while they were in the process of stealing motor bikes is not anodyne.

There are also more general histories, in particular the Algerian civil war. There is a genealogy of violence in

Europe which is broadly linked to the conflict which broke out in Algeria back in the 1990s.

This conflict is still present in people's memories and the brother of Mohamed Merah, for example, explains how the Algerian conflict affected generations of his family. It is also present via different generations of activists, through the transmission of know-how and legitimacy. We have heard of Djamel Beghal who was the mentor of the Kouachi brothers and of Coulibaly. Coulibaly was involved in the Armed Islamic Group (*GIA*) back in 1994. They are thought to have been involved in Belkacem's escape attempt, Belkacem being one of the explosives experts in the 1995 terrorist attacks.

What I am telling you about the Algerian example can be seen elsewhere. You have all heard of the French far left group, *Action Directe* (Direct Action) which was active in the late 70s. When Jean-Marc Rouillan became active in France in 1977, this was not where his violence began; his political activism had started years earlier, on the other side of the Pyrenees in the fight against the Franco regime, and as early as 1974 he was already a member of the *Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación* (MIL). So they are people who already have know-how and a legitimacy which they hand down.

The Algerian situation in the early 90s and the situation today are not the same. Activism was different then. When the *GIA* committed atrocities in France in 1995 it was to get France to remove its support for the Algerian regime. But in fact in 1995 the *GIA* thought it was going to be able to take over Algeria militarily. Today, there is no way the distant heirs of the *GIA*, AQIM, will be able to take over Algeria militarily, even if they are capable of successful incursions and actions at the extreme fringe of the Sahara and can cause great harm and damage. Activism is changing too, and the discourse no longer revolves around a desire for a military takeover in a given country.

This is translated into two phenomena: leaving for other theatres of conflict and propaganda through action. This theory was born at the end of the 19th century with the anarchists. It means that spectacular violent acts are necessary to incite the masses. But even the anarchists themselves would recognise that this theory isn't very convincing. Nevertheless, propaganda through action is the preferred mode of action for groups that have no social or territorial base. When Coulibaly left a posthumous video after committing the terrorist attacks, he exhorted Muslims to wake up.

In fact, these individuals who I have just described and who are committed radical activists are known to the intelligence services and are under surveillance. However, we could speak of the effects of the 2008 reform which in some ways weakened the ability of the intelligence services to get to know certain milieux. Nevertheless, neither the French anti-terrorist police nor the courts who deal with terrorism are completely without resources.

So why, given that all this exists, is there this enormous mobilisation around the question of radicalisation? Maybe it is because the question of political violence coincides with young people leaving for Syria and Iraq, although the two questions do not overlap completely.

Militant networks have been fighting for a long time in places outside of France such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc. And yet this conflict also attracts many individuals, especially young people and women, who are not part of this universe.

The intelligence services admit it: more than 50% of the individuals they identify were previously unknown to them. They are unknown and are the main target of the mobilisation around the question of radicalisation that we are talking about today. Underlying this interest in these particular individuals there is a legitimate fear, given that on their return from Syria some of them do indeed commit terrorist acts.

Having said this, even if these fears are legitimate, we should examine the issue by comparing what is going on today with the experience of people who have gone to fight abroad in the past. The conflicts in Syria and Iraq are not very different from other forms of commitment, of transnational activism. Examples would include the war in Spain, the experience of French volunteers with the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism who went to fight on the side of the Nazis, those who have gone to fight in Ukraine or the whole question of humanitarian work which isn't so far from what we see today.

I have made a comparison of all these elements. If we ask ourselves what makes individuals give up their

current lives and put themselves in danger in a distant land, we see that there are many reasons. Solidarity is an important aspect. Today, in some circles it is considered totally legitimate to go and fight the regime of Bashar Al Assad, in addition to the desire to leave. For some people it is a humanitarian issue, i.e. to go and help people in conflict zones. And then there are existential aspects and the quest to find oneself. If we examine the profile of people who leave, we observe great continuities such as former members of the military, sports people at risk and petty delinquents.

If we look at what is going on in the conflict zones themselves, we observe great similarities such as boredom or realisation of the horrors of war at the front. Islamic State has been obliged to create a police force to try to combat deserters.

When we look at the statistics of Europeans who have left for the front we can simplify and say that they are split into three thirds: one third are on the point of leaving, one third are actually out there and one third have come back. On their return the response of the institutions will be crucial in order to understand what will become of them.

In conclusion, I would like to make three points.

The first is the confusion between the question of political violence and the question of transnational activism. Confusing these two notions leads to a warmongering discourse, particularly in the domain of politics. It polarises people and divides the world into “them” and “us”. This discourse doesn’t work when we are in a situation such as the one today, that is to say that we are not really convinced that the tanks of Islamic State are at the gates of France. Unlike the question of war, political violence is not a two-way relationship but a three-way relationship. We have the terrorist organisations, the public authorities and, in third position, the majority of the public who are there as spectators of the confrontation between the first two. The first two have a discourse to mobilise others. But in reality, the majority of individuals are not mobilised in this confrontation. It is this indifference which is absolutely crucial if we don’t want these conflicts to increase and spread.

Note that if this type of conflict does mobilise a majority of people then the conflict lasts, as in Northern Ireland or Kurdistan, for example.

The problem we have today is that there is a high risk that the discourse calling on people to mobilise and to condemn will push those who were formerly neutral into the arms of those who are already mobilised, and in particular the arms of the radicals. This is exactly what happened in Northern Ireland, where the antiterrorist policies of the British authorities and especially Bloody Sunday precipitated 2000 young nationalist workers into the arms of the IRA commandos.

The second is more worrying. The cases of individuals who have become radicalised and are likely to leave for Syria represent just a minority of those that child welfare professionals deal with. With the mobilisation of politicians and the media around the question of radicalisation, the orders given to the child welfare services to take these questions on board may transform the mission of these professionals. Looking after children who are in danger is the job of these professionals, whatever the danger. But if we develop this action on the prevention of radicalisation are we not to a large extent dooming ourselves to failure?

The third and final point is that by focusing as we are doing today on radicalisation we are moving inexorably towards the question of religiosity, that is to say that radicalisation and religiosity are becoming two sides of the same question. I could give the example of England and M. Ragazzi who worked in Birmingham. It was observed that all the policies aiming at the prevention of delinquency had been reoriented to policies for the fight against radicalisation. In concrete terms, this meant that sports activities and programmes aimed at underprivileged children were now reserved for young Muslims in the neighbourhood. The result was a kind of exclusion of those young people who had not converted to Islam, with the risk of fuelling anti-Muslim speech. In some cases, the policy of the public authorities ends up constructing communities and obliging individuals to see themselves first and foremost as Muslims if they wish to take part in these activities and programmes, while at the same time constructing the rejection of this same community on the part of those who are refused access to these activities. In this way we end up with an ideological vision of the world which is not so very different from the vision Dabiq has, i.e. that the world is divided into Muslims and the others.

Fethi BENSLAMA

We need to begin by looking at the conceptual tools we use to consider this question of radicalisation. Since the month of January we have been invaded by a simplistic sociological discourse which transforms social conditions into factors of radicalisation. Fortunately this has been qualified and we have heard a number of reservations throughout the day. A factor means that there is a causal element which intervenes necessarily in a result. Where there is often confusion is between what are variables and what are factors.

We have a social variable, an individual variable, a political variable, an ideological variable in the phenomenon of radicalisation, but in no case can they be considered as factors. Neither the deprived neighbourhoods, nor an underprivileged social background, nor Islam are factors, by which I mean determining factors. We find young people who have become radicalised who do not come from run down areas, who do not come from an underprivileged social background, whose family are not Muslims, but they have converted during the radicalisation process (40% of radicalised individuals). We could even say that in their case radicalisation occurs before conversion. It must be borne in mind that the phenomenon of radicalisation is over-determined – it is a matter of individual psychology and the social context – and that it can be found in different forms virtually everywhere in the world. The form we mainly see today, but which in fact has existed for a quarter century, is Islamic jihadism, with a number of variations for obvious geopolitical reasons, as we can see if we look at a map of the conflicts and wars in the Muslim world and in particular in the Middle East. The reason why there is such a degree of radicalisation is to be found in these regions where violence between groups, organisations and States is endemic.

There is one variable, however, that we rarely speak of and which the ambient sociologism tends to suppress and that is the subjective variable. It is a given individual, regardless of the urban, social or religious category they belong to, who becomes radicalised, and not someone else. So the question we should ask ourselves and to which it is more difficult to find an answer using automatic factor-based reflexes is how someone can become part of a process which leads to becoming a terrorist, in other words a killer in the service of a cause which condones it.

There is another important variable, adolescence. According to the latest statistics, two thirds of the 3000 individuals who have been radicalised are between 15 and 25 years of age (24% are minors). This age bracket is characteristic of a drawn-out adolescence, particularly when the young people have problems, during the process of growing up and becoming an adult. Furthermore, there are some adults who continue to behave as adolescents for a good part of their lives, if not the whole of their lives. It is not for nothing that the psychopathology departments for adolescents are available for young people up to the age of 26, or even older. Prolonged adolescence is typical of modern society. Growing up isn't easy, even less so when the person is going through an identity crisis, which is not specific to the children of migrants.

The fact that jihadism attracts such young individuals, which wasn't the case for the initial generations of jihadists, isn't anodyne. These people have been targeted deliberately and it isn't impossible to imagine that in the future young children will be targeted. We might end up with child-terrorists in the same way that we have child-soldiers.

The promotion of jihadism has been increased using a mechanism which is comparable to the globalisation of the market, since jihadism is a market and like all markets it offers a variety of products which have become more attractive and easier to use. The British press has reported the case of terrorists who had been captured and who had ordered on the internet "Islam for dummies" and "The Qur'an for dummies". In the last few years it is via the internet that Jihadist recruiters have approached young people (according to Ministry of the Interior figures, 90% of young people who have been radicalised were informed in this way), but it isn't just a technical question. The new communication technologies are used as part of a strategy to decentralise and privatise the radicalisation process, with the aim of developing what is called "The leaderless jihad", which has been theorised by Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the strategists of jihadism in a book entitled "A Call for Global Islamic Resistance", which was published on the internet in 2005 (1600 pages).

What is jihadism all about? Its aim is to produce warriors. From this point of view, the notion of “radicalisation” is a catch-all one which has been imposed worldwide ever since the 9/11 attacks in the United States. It deliberately casts a wide net, but to the detriment of any kind of differentiation between those who have become radicalised and continue to practise their religion without any kind of violence and those who will join up as warriors. While not all Salafists are jihadists – some of them are quietists who reject violence – all jihadists have at some point been Salafists. These categories are thus permeable and depend on each individual’s personal trajectory, whence the difficulty in identifying those who are likely to turn to violent action, especially as the time it takes to train someone to become a warrior has speeded up considerably. In the 90s, several years of teaching and training were necessary, whereas today you can become a jihadist in six months.

If we forget that the aim of jihadism is to produce warriors then we won’t understand what is going on today. It is a war situation with a number of different belligerents and many fronts and has been for many years. After Afghanistan, the Algerian civil war, Yemen and Somalia, jihadism has found new territories in Iraq, Syria and sub-Saharan Africa. France is at war in some of these territories, the most important one being Mali, where she has fought and destroyed jihadist groups. The terrorist attacks in January 2015 were carried out in retaliation. The publication of the cartoons of the Prophet in 2006 was just a pretext.

What is the nature of what jihadism offers? It is based on the paradigm of an ideal, but in a particular form, that of a wounded ideal which must be restored. It targets young people who are going through a general identity crisis and attracts those, in the minority, who are in that moratorium zone on the path towards adulthood and are in particular difficulty and distress because of huge gaps in terms of their self-identity. It offers a complete ideal which fills these gaps and enables them to restore the self or even to create a new self, in other words a substitution through a belief where there is no place for doubt. These young people were thus in a state of expectation, with no perceptible pathology, especially to the untrained eye. Some of them are in a state of asymptomatic turmoil and these are the most dangerous individuals. After they have committed a terrorist attack they are often described thus: “he was a very nice young man”, “no problems”, “very helpful, he would carry the shopping for the old lady who lives on the fifth floor”, etc. In other cases their turmoil had already led them into delinquency and drug dependency, which doesn’t rule out a borderline or psychotic pathology. Jihadism thus transforms into a powerful armour the expectations of those with serious problems of identity. When what jihadism has to offer coincides with the expectations of the person, the gaps in their self-identity are no longer visible, they have been filled, a lead weight has been placed over them, the preceding psychological upheaval and disorder have been set in the stone of the ideals of extreme belief, which sedates all anxiety and provides a feeling of liberation and waves of omnipotence.

To understand all of this we mustn’t forget that under normal circumstances the period of adolescence is full of ideals. It corresponds to a kind of physical and psychological moulting which, to borrow the concept of Didier Anzieu, requires the constitution of a new protective envelope in which beliefs and their corresponding ideality play a leading role. It is a defensive positioning, thanks to which the adolescent can mature sufficiently to become autonomous through the elaboration of subjective and social interdependencies. It is this defence which becomes excessive or extreme in the case of a serious crisis of identity, and leads the subject to imprison himself in a radical belief in order to bring an end to his distress. When the subject is disturbed and has lost all points of reference, turning to an absolute ideality provides him with a kind of “psychological armour” which protects him from anxiety and from what he sees as attacks coming from the outside world.

It is this portrait of gaps in one’s identity and the way beliefs and ideals can fill them which we need in order to understand what jihadism has to offer. This is the conclusion I have come to through what I have observed during my clinical meetings with young radicalised individuals, some of whom have joined jihad, and also thanks to a lot of important research which has been done in France on the problems of adolescence. What jihadism has to offer has two sides or, to use a figurative image, it is structured like a moebius strip, where one moves from one side to the other without noticing. On one side the young person is invited to identify his suffering as the Islamic ideal which has been wounded. I will return later to this traumatic historico-mythical construction. The result of this identification as the wounded ideal is to create confusion between the suffering of the individual and the suffering of the community and to create the oceanic feeling of immense and incalculable harm. In the discourse of young people who are preparing to turn to violent action or have already done so, you will observe that they systematically position themselves as victims or, to be

more precise, as the curates of the dignity of a supreme cause which has been violated. They personify the wounded ideal. Whence the shift to the other side where they become avengers sent on a mission, heroic knights. This turn-around is fuelled by a chilling hatred which will seek satisfaction in the glorious outcome of combat and sacrifice.

Identifying with a wounded ideal as opposed to an ideal which has been restored through revenge offers subjects who generally have low self-esteem, who feel worthless, who feel they don't exist, a narcissistic promotion and exaltation which carry them so high that they leave the ordinary world and even go beyond the world. Another element to be taken into account is that some young people have such strong feelings of guilt and feel such reproaches that meeting someone who will guide them and impose external constraints releases them from the internal constraints they attempt to impose on themselves to control their impulses. Becoming a bearer of the restorative ideal allows delinquents to ennoble their antisocial or criminal impulses; better still, to become an outlaw in the name of the superior law of Islam and to claim for themselves the role of the protector of God. A father said to me one day: "my son has become the father of God". The reversal of the dominant-dominated relationship is another non negligible dimension of the ideal elevation of the subject. Certain young nobodies, or at least who live as if they were nobodies in their family or in their neighbourhood, become, thanks to the spectacular resource offered by the personified ideal, the voice of the moral authority of religion, kinds of self-designated imams who inspire fear, or even terror, particularly in the women of the family, their mother and their sisters. But the most radical position in the resource of the extreme ideal is a suicidal melancholy leading to self-sacrifice.

Where does this wounded ideal of Islam come from? The radicalisation we see today is a phenomenon that affects the whole of the Muslim world, from Morocco to Indonesia. No society is free of it. It is therefore is discord which permeates everywhere that Muslims live, including when they are in the minority in countries of recent immigration. When a phenomenon of this magnitude affects an entire civilisation, it means that it has been shaken right to its anthropological foundations. The prescribed formula in this case is to speak of a move into the modern age, but this is a generalisation which rings hollow even though it isn't wrong. It needs to be refined and examined on different levels of human organisation, through the transformations and fractures that it has sustained.

I would like to rapidly draw the main elements of what I call the "wound of the Islamic ideal" at the level of the political structure or, in other words, of what it is that establishes the subjects in their relationship with sovereignty and power. Why at this level? Because jihadism corresponds to a civil war between Muslims the object of whom is in fact the Muslim, namely the power to define who is Muslim and who isn't, in other words to speak "in the Name of Islam". It is in the name of this Name that war is being fought today. If there is a war it is because there are disagreements, divergences, confrontation. In the fourteen-century long history of Muslims, there have of course been disagreements about what it means "to be a Muslim", about the sovereign, or what we call the caliph, but the magnitude, extent and violence of what has happened since the 1920s-1930s and which accelerated during the 70s, has never been seen before. What happened? It is the acceleration of the entry of the Muslim world into the age of the Enlightenment which began at the beginning of the 19th century with colonial conquests. The apotheosis of the adoption of certain cultural inventions and secular policies by part of the élite, in opposition to another part of the élite who maintained religious traditions, was the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the end of the last Islamic empire and the establishment of the secular Turkish State, replacing the Ottoman Empire which had reigned for 624 years. These three events in one (abolition, collapse, substitution) had the effect of splitting up idealities for an entire civilisation. In the eyes of many Muslims it was a catastrophe which interrupted the tradition of sovereign succession in Islam, the Caliph being the symbolic curate of the Prophet, from the very beginning. Without the Islamic principle of sovereignty, the Muslim community no longer has a universal political subject. Islamic movements appeared during this period, in reaction to this traumatism. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928. The symbolic traumatism was all the more cruel that Muslims were no longer masters in their own countries, because of colonial occupations and the carving up of the territories of the empire into nations that were cobbled together and controlled by the Western powers. The goal of all the Islamic movements is to restore the Caliphate and re-establish the Islamic ideal which, in the words of the Muslim Brotherhood's slogan, is that "Islam has an answer to everything". This means the self-sufficiency of the Muslim religion to be able to react to all the problems encountered by its subject, and in particular its relationship to the law, which implies restoring theological law, which is called Sharia. Re-establishing the sovereignty of the Caliphate and Islamic law, this is what the combat of all the currents of political Islamism

is all about. So they are movements to restore an Islamic order which was destroyed by the loss of the principle of sovereignty and the system of laws. This is the configuration of the wounded ideal.

This process began when, in spite of the violence of colonialism, Muslims became proponents of the Enlightenment, having understood that the Western Enlightenment brought with it inventions that were worth taking up, especially at the level of the political constitution of a modern state governed by the rule of law and citizenship. For them there was no contradiction between this and Islam as a faith, but they placed the principle of sovereignty on the side of the national State, which implied civil (secular) laws, even if they could well be inspired by Islam. However, this current was to encounter an ever more radical opposition through anti-Enlightenment theories, the same as those which underpin the Islamic movements, which want to restore the Caliphate and Sharia law, against the National State and its law. What we have had here, for at least two centuries, is one of the major turnarounds of modernity, the challenge and the stakes of conflicting foundations of human groups.

This conflict has been analysed by an important German sociologist, Fernand Tönnies, who has shown how the European world has shifted from a community-style organisation based on filiation at the centre of which we find custom and religion towards a social organisation based on exchange, contracts, functions handled by the State and normative rules of law. This shift of the community towards society is the basis of the subjective transition of modernity that we see in action in different regions of the planet, at different speeds, but which always triggers civil wars and also all kinds of terrorism. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Islamist movements want to destroy the national states. When the first democratic elections were held in Tunisia in 2012, where the Islamists won, the first declaration of the future Prime Minister was to proclaim the coming of the reign of the sixth Caliphate.

Such is the nature of the civil war in the Muslim world today, between those in favour of restoring the community of believers and its principle of the sovereignty of the Caliphate, and those who are for a society of contractors whose principle of sovereignty is the national State. The combat is not therefore between secularism (*laïcité*) and religion, many believers wanting to be citizens and not subjects of the community, but between two ways of aggregating human groups and two types of power which govern them. Of course, the weight of religion in the social model is not the same as in the community model, but the first one doesn't necessarily remove all reference to religion, including in the State, as we can observe in many modern nations.

It was in the 70s that the civil war progressed and this for two reasons. First of all, because the governments of the national States which resulted from the fight against colonialism were incapable of meeting the aspirations of their populations. Much more, they did nothing about the soaring demography and thus increased the disruption of the anthropological structures of the world. In addition, with the approval of the United States, Saudi Arabia undertook to fund the Islamist movements in the hope of controlling them and protecting the monarchies. Oil played a huge role. According to C. Wesley, former CIA chief, Saudi Arabia provided 90 billion dollars over a period of 40 years to finance these movements.

In this open air laboratory the figure of the "Supermuslim", as I have called him, appeared out of the anti-Enlightenment movement. It corresponds to an ideology of redemption based on the postulate that if Muslims have been vanquished, it is because they have betrayed their religion, their tradition. The restoration of the wounded ideal involves what I call an "over-identification", which is a process of escalation with respect to identification. It is no longer enough to be an ordinary Muslim; today one has to be seen, to be heard, to show visible signs, to increase one's devotional practices, whence the full face veils and beards, the trappings which were supposedly those from the time of the Prophet, prayers in the streets, which didn't exist before, and, above all, the obligation to take the law into one's own hands, in all meanings of the expression, to atone for and apply theological law. This inflation comes from the violent demands of the superego which require ever more sacrifice, ever more purification as in an auto-immune mode. This figure of the Supermuslim isn't pure rhetoric, it explains an observable reality; this is what makes it possible to produce jihadists, who are prepared to sacrifice themselves, to become martyrs, in other words to become immortal, this is what gives rise to a political view based not on the preservation of life but on the spending of life, which we could call *thanatopolitics*.

M. Baranger: Thank you. We have spoken about a multidisciplinary approach to the question and we have here two very different views and ways of considering this phenomenon of radicalisation. The comments

made by M. Benslama on the Caliphate remind us of the work of Pierre Legendre on the construction of the State in the West. I was struck by the recruiting methods and in particular the fact that children may well be targeted by the jihadists.

QUESTIONS

Mme Andrea, investigating judge in Lyon: Following on from what you have told us about what jihadism has to offer, how do you explain that it resonates with non-Muslim Western adolescents? How do they identify with this wounded ideal which basically has nothing to do with their own culture? Is there a special propaganda aimed at non-Muslims?

M. Benslama: The gaps in one's identity are not specific to the children of migrants, in general, and of Muslim families in particular. The ideals of extreme beliefs appear as solutions for those who are going through an identity crisis. Who else offers such ideals other than sects and an extreme form of Islamism? The latter offers even more, since it offers young people the possibility of going to war, of becoming a hero and not just to be under the control of a guru.

M. Baranger: Is what jihadism is offering the offer of the day, so to speak, similar to the Red Brigades in the past?

M. Benslama: Yes. It relies on a very potent historical background which remains in the consciousness of those who promote Islamism. Although these historic events occurred more than a century ago, subjective reality doesn't function at the same pace as external social reality. So another very important factor has to be considered. It is necessary to look at the family history of an adolescent who becomes a missionary. It is not enough to examine what happens to the adolescent, it is also necessary to examine the family history.

Etienne Le Roy, anthropologist: I was particularly interested by the references to the Caliphate and the reference to Tönnies who analysed the shift from society to the community. Far too often we stop at society and assume that it is an irreversible and definitive shift. But our societies are in the process of transforming themselves and what we thought was a definitive change of civilisation is, on the contrary, changing in our own societies. In the face of the complexity of the world, and increasing globalisation, our societies are living through other revolutions of which we speak less, and in particular, the revolution of the commons, that is to say a new way of constructing symbolic communities.

Within Western societies we are capable of developing symbolic communities, which could stand in opposition to the desirable community of the Caliphate, constructions which would be far easier to construct than what the jihadists promote. We need to open our collective eyes to these new realities and maybe this will enable our societies to find answers which would be far more useful in terms of constructing the future and offering an opening to truly enriching lives rather than just mobilising the state institutions, which as we know are somewhat ineffectual.

M. Benslama: I agree with you completely. What made me aware of this is the revolution in Tunisia, one of the countries in the Muslim world which, like Turkey, shifted from community to society. During my research I met Fernand Tönnies and he gave a very vivid account of what was happening before our very eyes, in the transition in Tunisia. Other thinkers, following on from Tönnies, have added nuances to this transition in Tunisia. Within societies there are also micro-communities which develop. The social world in which we live has become tougher and tougher, with cities and urban conurbations of up to 20 million inhabitants, so people are necessarily driven to recreate links of affiliation. It is maybe in this sense that many people are seeking a formula which, while not rejecting society, includes kinds of enclaves of communities. I think we should try not to castigate communitarianism. There are ways of creating commonality which would not be a return to communitarianism but which would create spaces where life would be more liveable for subjects in the modern world which is becoming more and more brutal and unbearable.

M. Le Roy: But they must be open enclaves which communicate and which do not act against the State, and which play the game not of opposition but of complementarity. It is this new type of paradigm that we must develop.

Testimonies and avenues to be explored

Moderated by Christina RINALDIS, Vice-President at the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Créteil

Mme PAUCHER, juvenile court judge in Bobigny

Mme MAHOUCHE, PJJ social worker, liaison officer for laïcité

Mme LAXALTE, social worker at the UEMO in Créteil

Presentation by Mme Ben Said

In this session we will hear a number of testimonies and proposals for avenues of research and reflection. Let me begin by introducing the speakers: Mme Mahouche is chief officer and liaison officer for citizenship in Seine Saint-Denis, Mme Paucher is a juvenile court judge in Bobigny and Mme Laxalte is a social worker at the *Unité éducative de milieu ouvert* (UEMO, Open educational support unit) in Créteil, Val de Marne.

The aim of this session is to examine and discuss the issues based on the experience of the different professionals. The idea is to be able to express the doubts and hesitations we have in the areas of educational assistance and criminal matters.

Madame LAXALTE

I would like to talk about a rehabilitation order which was handed down to a 17-year-old adolescent. He had been brought before the court on charges of ‘justification of an act of terrorism’, ‘public provocation to commit an act of terrorism’ and ‘public insults on grounds of race and religion using public means of communication’.

At a period in his life when he was constantly on the social media and instant news channels, this minor read a hashtag on Twitter, “#Palestinian, no”. He replied using the hashtag “#Jewish, no”. He spent the next few days adding to the exchanges, insulting Jewish people, inserting a photo of a Jewish school and a rocket launcher, proffering insults and making provocative remarks, boasting that he knew how to make a bomb. It was his first brush with the criminal law. During interviews with him he made it clear that he wanted to make an impression, by talking of a war on the web. He wanted to up the ante in this battle of words on the internet, his goal being to win.

It is very rare to see this kind of case in our service and during the interviews we worked as a team to try to find the best solution for this minor in the context of the youth protection measure. This young man had expressed the desire to meet Jewish people as part of this measure and we suggested a trip to the Museum of Art and History of Judaism in Paris, rue du Temple. He is an adolescent who has a certain general culture, who read a lot and was very interested in historical events and in conflicts where he always took the side of the oppressed. At this time he was mainly interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but it wasn’t all he mentioned. He cooperated fully with us, as did his parents, with whom we were able to work on the question.

This young man also had many questions around the issue of freedom of expression and had a great feeling of injustice, since he had been brought before the courts but his detractors hadn’t. He also had many questions about the media and the way deprived neighbourhoods and Muslim populations were stigmatised. His family history was marked by the conflicts in Algeria as his family was of Algerian origin and he had a lot of questions about the way his family history was handed down, about the appropriation of his family’s past and about his place in society.

The parents, also Muslims, were deeply affected by these proceedings and started to have doubts as to what

they had handed down to their children. How could a naturalised French citizen of Muslim faith live his citizenship in France? This type of question was discussed during the interviews.

As for the practical aspects of the measure, we contacted the museum. Their website is very well done and we found a lot of things which helped us to prepare the visit, in particular through the information intended mainly for teachers and organised around educational projects. There was a project on stereotypes and prejudice; I gave the young man some excerpts and we worked together on the theme.

The museum guide was very interested in the project and made every effort to tailor the visit and adapt it to the young man. The guide asked me a number of personal questions and I asked the parents and the young man before answering whether they authorised me to divulge certain information, in particular on what had happened and on the young man's religion. This helped the guide to plan the visit. We were asked to make a financial contribution of 40 euros, and the young man paid something towards it. The visit focused on points of reference so as to understand Jewish civilisation, and on the social construction of Jewish people and on what led to the exclusion of these populations. The young man directed the discussion towards the issue of the Wailing Wall and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Later on he mentioned the benevolent attitude of the guide.

Whereas juvenile rehabilitation measures usually include collective actions, in the case of this young man we decided to limit them to individual measures to enable him to ask the questions he wanted to ask.

In conclusion, rehabilitation measures are useful both as a medium and a support to open up and deconstruct the representation which have a negative connotation, but I don't have time here today to develop this further. The rehabilitation measure is not sufficient on its own but offers a time and a place for exchange and dialogue. It is a complement and has to be implemented alongside other measures.

In the case I have just mentioned, we had an element of rehabilitation and also an investigative element. The measure was implemented, the young man's state of health permitting; he was vulnerable and had bouts of anxiety during which it was impossible to elaborate a project.

Mme MAHOUCHE

I would like to return to the question of liaison officers for *laïcité* (secularism). Given the context, there came a moment when we asked ourselves what had gone wrong. Individuals such as the Kouachi brothers or Mohamed Merah had slipped through the net. We wanted to refocus on who comes into our care, on educational assistance and, in particular, on the issue of living together in harmony. We have to be capable of making a professional judgement and the fact that a young person buys a prayer mat, for example, doesn't necessarily mean that he is going to turn to radicalisation and violence. There is a lot of confusion and we must be careful not to jump to hasty conclusions about what we understand and what we think might happen.

It is interesting to note that the PJJ has decided to devote resources to rethinking the work of the different kinds of social workers in this particular context. The minors we work with today are not very different to those we worked with a few years ago. They express themselves differently but the educational side of our activity is the same, as it is a question of accompanying an adolescent who is finding his feet and building his future. Today, what with the social networks, the geopolitical crises, the economic crises and the globalisation of problems, there is a loss of information, a loss of points of reference, against the backdrop of a social crisis. All these elements get confused and this is what leads to the context we have today. Considerable funding has been provided and as a liaison officer for *laïcité* I tell myself that we have what we need to support these people and help them rebuild their lives more easily. The idea is to set up more and more innovative projects and to reinvent the way we work with these young people.

As part of the action plan to prevent radicalisation, the PJJ intervenes on two levels.

The first is the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice at inter-ministerial level. It was organised through the creation of "departmental units". The way these units functioned raised much concern to begin with: were

names being circulated, was there any confidentiality and were the rights of the families being respected? Having worked with these units I can assure you that the answer is yes. The aim of these units is to coordinate the various services at local, departmental level and to see what actions and resources can be brought into play to help the parents. The idea is to provide more counselling and support for families who are at a loss as to what to do about children who are prepared to leave for jihad or are in the process of becoming radicalised. The role of the PJJ in these units is to offer their experience in how to handle complex situations. Juvenile delinquency is a case in point. We need to be able to work within these units in order to harmonise and provide a support for their work.

The second is at institutional level when the services take charge of certain juveniles. The liaison officer for *laïcité* isn't actually designated as being a specialist in the matter. His or her work is situated at national level since there are 70 of us nationwide and our job is to try to mesh together the different local services in order to complement the actions of the social workers. We can however provide specific support. The idea is to support projects and thus justify them so as to obtain funding. The aim is to provide help for families and for adolescents who are in distress and in danger.

What happened in January hasn't revolutionised social work, but it obliges us to examine our approach, innovate and focus more on aspects that we considered less important in the past. The question of the rules of *laïcité* (secularism) in a hostel or other form of accommodation is extremely important, since young people who are under a court order must have somewhere to live which they find bearable. Social workers who now have to take this on board may well find it rather disturbing, never having had to consider it before because it went without saying that secularism was the rule. The question of *laïcité* comes up in hostels and the appropriate facilities must be provided so that a minor who wishes to pray must be able to do so, since he has the right to practise his religion. So what we have to do is to devise ground rules which are clear for everybody, with a degree of flexibility.

Mme PAUCHER

I have been a juvenile court judge at the courts in Bobigny since September 2014. I have studied the question of the influence of sects over people and the title of my research paper was "*Le juge des enfants face aux sectes*" (Juvenile court judges and sects). There is a whole debate as to whether radicalisation is a question of sects, but they have enough in common to suggest that similarities exist and that they could be considered together.

I am the liaison officer for the juvenile court in Bobigny within the prefectural unit responsible for the fight against radicalisation. The idea has been put forward to focus on court intervention and in particular educational assistance measures. This is the result of a number of observations. The first is that it isn't easy for a court judge to fit into this prefectural unit. Under no circumstances are lists of names to be given, but it does provide the opportunity to give precise answers about what we do to precise questions. At the last meeting, for example, people from the Prefecture were able to ask how to refer someone to a juvenile court judge. This might seem pretty basic but it isn't obvious for everybody.

It is true that there is this question of radicalisation and a legitimate desire on the part of professionals to invest their time but we also know that there are young people who do leave for conflict zones. One of the conclusions we came to in conjunction with our colleagues from the juvenile court in Bobigny is that not only are we faced with sectarianism in Islam but also in other religions. In a certain number of cases we come across possible incidences of sectarianism in evangelical churches and in certain voodoo cults.

We also observed that we rarely received applications for educational assistance on the part of the prosecution service or of parents where young people are at risk of radicalisation. In discussions with colleagues on the subject we realised that these questions do come up and applications are made, but are not necessarily formulated in such terms. In other words, both the question of radicalisation and the question of sectarianism in other religions are included in an application for educational assistance.

We have more cases where it is the parents whose practices might be a cause for concern and where it is the

children who need protecting. We must return to the essence of our profession: a juvenile court judge is first and foremost concerned with danger. So the question is not so much whether or not we have before us a form of violent radicalisation as whether this form of isolation, of social alienation is potentially sufficiently dangerous for us to take action in the name of educational assistance.

To illustrate this, I received an application concerning a family where an adolescent girl was in serious conflict with her mother, who had converted and was very devout. The young girl couldn't stand her mother's radicalisation. There were three other children in the family and I became involved for two little girls. I handed down an educational assistance order in open custody and the objectives of the measure were to guarantee that the girls joined in a minimum number of activities for children of their age, without running any risk in their school education and their social construction. At the beginning, the mother tore up all the drawings the girls brought back from school, as they included representations of human beings, which the mother claimed was forbidden in Islam. Gradually, the mother accepted this, as reported by the open educational support unit (UEMO), and so the educational assistance order was lifted as the children were no longer in danger.

It is very helpful to define the notions of danger properly and to train judges in matters of sectarianism and radicalisation, whether in Islam or in other religions. We continuously have recourse to sociology, to anthropology and to all the humanities.

The idea would be to list all available resources and thus to be able to know who to call on for advice when confronted by a problem of religious radicalisation or sectarianism.

In conclusion, I have the feeling that we sometimes forget the personal history of the individual we are dealing with. The only dossier I know of in Bobigny where we had very good reason to think that it was a young adult who had left for a conflict zone was a young man whose past was punctuated by violence and which was a failure of the child protection agencies. The first bulwark is to concentrate on child protection, right from early childhood.